Introduction
India’s Constitution establishes a quasi-federal structure characterized by a distinct centripetal bias, described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as being federal during normal times but unitary during emergencies. This structural leaning towards federal supremacy is embedded within the distribution of legislative powers in the Seventh Schedule to ensure national integrity, administrative coherence, and uniform macroeconomic growth.
Constitutional Leaning Towards Federal Supremacy in the Seventh Schedule
The constitutional architecture of legislative competence explicitly gives primacy to Union laws over State enactments across multiple dimensions:
- Primacy of the Union List (Article 246): The Union List contains more entries (originally 97) than the State List (66), covering strategic domains like defence, foreign affairs, and inter-state trade. The non-obstante clause in Article 246 gives overriding effect to Union legislation in cases of jurisdictional overlap.
- Doctrine of Repugnancy (Article 254): When both Parliament and a State legislature enact laws on a Concurrent List entry, the Central legislation overrides State legislation to the extent of any repugnancy, unless the State law received Presidential assent.
- Vesting of Residuary Powers (Article 248): In contrast to traditional federations like the United States, residuary legislative powers are vested exclusively in Parliament, enabling it to regulate emerging domains like cyber technology and space.
- Exceptional Parliamentary Encroachment: Parliament can legislate on subjects within the State List under specific conditions, including national interest under a Rajya Sabha resolution (Article 249), a national emergency (Article 250), or to implement international treaties (Article 253).
Strengthening the Centre in Practice: Contemporary Working
This constitutional bias has translated into substantial institutional and functional leverage for the Union Government over states:
- Fiscal Centralisation and Legislative Overrides: The Centre leverages its legislative supremacy to harmonize national economic policy, at times limiting state fiscal space. Even when judicial pronouncements uphold state autonomy—such as the Supreme Court's 9-judge bench ruling in Mineral Area Development Authority (2024) affirming states' rights to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II—Parliament retains the power to enact overarching central regulations or amendments to restrict state levies for uniform national mineral development.
- Fiscal Leverage via Cesses and Surcharges: Through provisions like Article 271, the Centre levies cesses and surcharges that remain outside the divisible tax pool, shrinking the proportional unconditional devolution of resources to states and increasing their dependence on tied Central sector schemes.
- Borrowing and Expenditure Controls: Under Article 293(3), states require Central consent to raise open-market loans if any central loan remains outstanding. The Centre strictly enforces fiscal ceilings through Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) caps, regulating off-budget borrowings and state welfare expenditures.
- Administrative Directives (Articles 256 and 257): The executive power of states must be exercised in compliance with Union laws and directions, facilitating the seamless execution of national developmental and security projects across state boundaries.
Conclusion
While constitutional supremacy prevents regional fragmentation and enables uniform national development, uncalibrated centralisation risks eroding state autonomy. Sustaining healthy federal ties requires revitalising constitutional dialogue platforms like the Inter-State Council under Article 263 and respecting consensual decision-making within cooperative bodies like the GST Council.