Introduction
During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar observed that while a democratic executive must ideally satisfy both stability and responsibility, existing constitutional systems had not devised a mechanism to guarantee both equally. The framers deliberately chose the British Parliamentary model over the American Presidential model because continuous and daily executive accountability was deemed essential for a diverse, nascent democracy.
Constitutional Prioritisation of Accountability over Stability
The framers embedded several mechanisms ensuring that the executive remains accountable to the legislature on an ongoing basis rather than at periodic electoral intervals:
- Continuous Legislative Oversight: Parliamentary mechanisms such as Question Hour, Zero Hour, Calling Attention Motions, and Adjournment Motions ensure regular, daily scrutiny of executive policies and administrative actions.
- Principle of Collective Responsibility: Under Article 75(3), the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. The government survives only as long as it commands the confidence of the popular House, making it vulnerable to removal through a No-Confidence Motion.
- Diffusion of Power and Representation: By drawing the political executive directly from the legislature, the system guards against authoritarian tendencies. The framers accepted the inherent risk of ministerial instability and coalition volatility (as witnessed during 1989–1999) to ensure accommodation of India's diverse social fabric.
Contemporary Challenges: The Tilt toward Executive Dominance
While the design prioritised accountability, evolving institutional practices have increasingly shifted the balance toward stability and executive pre-eminence:
- Bypassing Departmentally Related Standing Committees: Detailed legislative scrutiny has diminished significantly. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only about 16% of bills were referred to parliamentary committees, weakening deep deliberation.
- Overuse of Ordinances and Guillotine: Frequent promulgation of ordinances under Article 123 circumvents pre-legislative debate, while widespread use of the 'guillotine' ensures budgetary demands are passed without line-by-line examination.
- Impact of the Anti-Defection Law: Enacted under the Tenth Schedule to prevent government instability, the law forces legislators to adhere strictly to party whips under threat of disqualification, stifling intra-party debate and subordinating representative accountability to executive survival.
Conclusion
The Indian Parliamentary system succeeded in preventing executive dictatorship by enshrining collective responsibility. However, restoring institutional vigour through compulsory committee referrals, institutionalised opposition mechanisms such as shadow cabinets, and revisiting the Anti-Defection Law is necessary to ensure that accountability remains pre-eminent.