Introduction
The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Indian Constitution via the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb unprincipled floor-crossing and the culture of opportunistic politics ('Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram'). While it aimed to bring stability to elected governments, recurring political crises across states have revealed significant structural flaws in its operational working.
Key Issues and Challenges
- Speaker Bias and Procedural Delays: Because Speakers are drawn from political parties, they often act in a partisan manner by indefinitely delaying disqualification petitions filed against members backing the ruling coalition. In the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020), the Supreme Court criticized these indefinite delays in the Manipur Assembly and ruled that Speakers must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period, typically three months.
- Misuse of the Merger Exception: Although the 91st Amendment Act, 2003, omitted the one-third 'split' protection, it retained the exception under Paragraph 4 allowing defections if two-thirds of the legislature party agrees to a 'merger'. In the Subhash Desai case (2023) during the Maharashtra political crisis, the Supreme Court clarified that a legislature party cannot act independently of the original political party, highlighting that the clause has effectively incentivised wholesale defection over retail defection.
- Erosion of Legislative Autonomy and Dissent: The unchecked issuance of party whips forces legislators to act as mere party delegates rather than representatives of their constituents. This blanket control stifles internal democracy, constructive debate, and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech within legislatures under Articles 105 and 194.
- Inability to Prevent Horse-Trading and Strategic Resignations: The anti-defection framework penalizes individual floor-crossing but provides no remedy against engineered resignations designed to artificially bring down the house strength and alter legislative majorities, nor does it penalize the parties orchestrating these moves.
Way Forward
- Limiting the Scope of the Whip: As recommended by the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990), party whips should be restricted solely to votes that determine government survival, such as confidence and no-confidence motions or money bills.
- Independent Adjudicatory Mechanism: To eliminate partisan bias, adjudicatory powers under the Tenth Schedule should be transferred from the Presiding Officer to an independent tribunal headed by a retired judge, or to the President/Governor acting on the binding advice of the Election Commission of India, as endorsed by the Law Commission's 170th Report.
Conclusion
To safeguard constitutional morality and restore legislative integrity, India must overhaul the Tenth Schedule. Ensuring swift, neutral adjudication and distinguishing genuine democratic dissent from opportunistic floor-crossing is vital to protecting the spirit of parliamentary democracy.