Introduction
Part XX, Article 368 of the Indian Constitution vests constituent power in Parliament to amend the constitutional text by way of addition, variation, or repeal. Designed by the framers to avoid both the rigidity of the United States Constitution and the extreme flexibility of the British system, Article 368 provides a calibrated, multi-tier mechanism that safeguards constitutional fundamentals while accommodating socio-political evolution.
Procedure Prescribed under Article 368
The formal procedure for amending the Constitution is governed strictly by the provisions of Article 368:
- Introduction of the Bill: An amendment bill may be introduced in either House of Parliament. It can be initiated by a minister or a private member and does not require the prior recommendation of the President.
- Dual Special Majority Requirement: Each House must pass the bill separately. Passage mandates a dual threshold: an absolute majority (more than 50%) of the total membership of that House, combined with a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.
- Absence of Joint Sitting: There is no provision for a joint sitting under Article 108 to resolve a deadlock between the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on a constitutional amendment bill; disagreement between the Houses leads to the lapse of the bill.
- Federal Ratification: Where the amendment seeks to alter entrenched federal provisions—such as the distribution of legislative powers (Seventh Schedule), representation of states in Parliament, the election of the President, or the provisions of Article 368 itself—it must be ratified by resolutions passed by the legislatures of at least half the states by a simple majority before being presented for assent.
- Mandatory Presidential Assent: Following due passage, the bill is presented to the President, who must accord assent. Under the 24th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971, the President cannot withhold assent or return the bill for reconsideration.
Reason for the Defeat of the Amendment Bill
A constitutional amendment bill may command a clear simple majority of members voting, yet still fail to pass because it falls short of the stringent dual criteria mandated by Article 368(2):
- Failure to Meet the Two-Thirds Threshold: In parliamentary practice, securing more "Ayes" than "Noes" satisfies a simple majority. For instance, in the vote on the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026, the bill garnered 298 votes in favor and 230 against out of 528 members present and voting. While 298 votes easily surpassed the absolute majority threshold of total Lok Sabha membership (272 out of 543), it failed to reach the required two-thirds of those present and voting (which required at least 352 votes).
- Separation of Majorities: Because both conditions (absolute majority of the total House and two-thirds of voting members) are cumulative and non-negotiable, a high voter turnout with substantial opposition can defeat a bill even if the governing party commands a numerical majority of the total House.
Flexibility versus Rigidity: Evaluating the Balance
The requirement of a special majority under Article 368 effectively mediates between the conflicting needs of constitutional permanence and democratic responsiveness:
- Deterrence of Majoritarian Overreach: By denying a transient simple majority the power to amend organic law, the special majority prevents partisan capture of core institutions. It obliges the ruling party to build a cross-party national consensus.
- Three-Tier Structural Calibration: The Constitution balances flexibility and rigidity across its provisions: minor administrative adjustments (such as Articles 2, 3, and 169) require only a simple majority outside Article 368; the substantive body requires a special majority; and core federal provisions demand state concurrence. This design averts the petrifaction of the US Constitution while preserving greater stability than the unwritten British constitution.
- Risk of Legislative Gridlock: The complete prohibition of joint sittings under Article 108 can occasionally result in institutional paralysis, where vital structural reforms languish due to acute inter-cameral friction or intense political polarization.
Conclusion
As observed by Granville Austin, the amendment mechanism conceives the Constitution as a dynamic, living document rather than an unalterable covenant. Combined with the judicial shield of the Basic Structure doctrine established in Kesavananda Bharati, Article 368 successfully harmonizes institutional stability with democratic adaptation.