Introduction
Under Article 148 of the Constitution, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) is established as the guardian of the public purse. Article 151 mandates the CAG to lay audit reports before Parliament and state legislatures, where the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examines them, creating a vital institutional mechanism for legislative oversight of public expenditure.
Complementary Roles: Synergy in Financial Accountability
- "Friend, Philosopher, and Guide": The CAG conducts rigorous technical audits (compliance, financial, and performance) but lacks independent punitive or enforcement powers. It provides the empirical and evidentiary foundation to guide the PAC through complex budgetary figures and financial irregularities.
- Division of Labour in Scrutiny: The CAG audits Appropriation Accounts, Finance Accounts, and Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). While the PAC focuses on examining the CAG's reports on Appropriation and Finance accounts, reports on public enterprises are handled by the Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU), ensuring focused legislative scrutiny.
- Fact-Finder to Action-Driver: The CAG acts as the technical fact-finder by detecting irregularities, leakages, and cost overruns (as highlighted in recent performance audits on schemes like PMJAY and Bharatmala). In response, the PAC functions as the political action-driver by summoning executive officials for questioning, demanding explanations, and submitting actionable reports to Parliament.
Institutional Limitations
- Post-Mortem Scrutiny: Both institutions operate primarily through ex-post facto examination after public funds have already been expended, rendering the scrutiny retrospective rather than preventive.
- Advisory Recommendations: PAC recommendations are not legally binding on executive ministries, and Action Taken Reports (ATRs) submitted by government departments frequently suffer from administrative delays.
- Jurisdictional Constraints: Public bodies, special purpose vehicles, and non-budgetary public charitable trusts like the PM-CARES Fund remain outside the constitutional audit purview of the CAG, restricting the scope of parliamentary oversight.
Conclusion
The CAG and the PAC serve as indispensable twin pillars of parliamentary financial democracy. Enhancing their synergy through real-time data audits, concurrent scrutiny, and legally mandated deadlines for executive Action Taken Reports is critical to transition from post-mortem analysis to proactive fiscal accountability.