Introduction
Indian federalism has transitioned from a centralised quasi-federal structure into a multifaceted, dynamic matrix characterised by simultaneous cooperation, competition, and confrontation. This evolution reflects shifting political alignments, economic liberalisation, and heightened sub-national aspirations, shaping intergovernmental relations across legislative, administrative, and fiscal spheres.
1. Cooperative Federalism: Shared Governance and Institutionalised Dialogue
Cooperative federalism involves the Union and States collaborating to resolve national concerns and pool decision-making powers.
- Pooled Fiscal Sovereignty: The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, established under Article 279A, represents a constitutional experiment where the Centre and States share tax autonomy. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted that Indian federalism is an ongoing dialogue of uncooperative and cooperative federalism.
- Predictable Fiscal Devolution: The Finance Commission, constituted under Article 280, anchors cooperative fiscal architecture by recommending a structured devolution of net tax proceeds (currently 41%), complemented by intergovernmental platforms like NITI Aayog's Governing Council.
2. Competitive Federalism: Horizontal Rivalry and Efficiency
Competitive federalism encourages horizontal rivalry among States to attract investments and improve developmental outcomes.
- Performance Benchmarking: Indices formulated by NITI Aayog, including the SDG India Index, Export Preparedness Index, and State Energy and Climate Index, incentivise peer comparison and evidence-based governance reforms.
- Capital and Investment Attraction: States compete directly for domestic and foreign investments, clean energy infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing units, and industrial incentives, driving competitive deregulation and ease of doing business.
3. Confrontational Federalism: Friction Points and Contestation
Divergent political priorities and centralising tendencies frequently manifest as institutional friction between the Union and States.
- Gubernatorial Impasse: Delays and withholding of legislative assent by Governors under Article 200 have caused constitutional logjams, as observed in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor (2023).
- Fiscal Contestation: The proliferation of non-divisible cesses and surcharges alongside borrowing ceilings imposed under Article 293(3) has provoked pushback, notably in State of Kerala v. Union of India (2024).
- Administrative and Investigative Tussles: State withdrawals of general consent to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) illustrate contestation over executive jurisdiction and perceived politicisation of central agencies.
Way Forward
To channel confrontational tendencies into productive outcomes, constitutional bodies must be revitalised.
- Institutionalising the Inter-State Council: Regularising meetings of the Inter-State Council under Article 263 provides a structured forum for consensus-building and conflict resolution.
- Implementing Commission Reforms: Adopting the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions regarding gubernatorial conduct and consultation prior to legislation on Concurrent subjects can preserve federal equilibrium.
Conclusion
Indian federalism operates along a spectrum where contestation and collaboration inevitably coexist. Grounding Union-State interactions in genuine consultation and strengthening constitutional dispute-resolution mechanisms will ensure that competitive and confrontational forces remain constructive rather than disruptive.