Introduction
The 102nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2018 inserted Article 338B to grant constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC), overcoming the perceived shortcomings of its 1993 statutory predecessor. This transition has renewed debates regarding the adequacy of statutory architecture, triggering sustained demands to similarly confer constitutional status upon institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Commission for Women (NCW).
Rationale Behind the Demand: Structural Limitations of Statutory Bodies
- Advisory Nature of Recommendations: Both the NHRC and NCW possess merely recommendatory powers under their respective statutes. In the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association case, the Supreme Court famously characterized the NHRC as a "toothless tiger" whose directives are routinely ignored or selectively implemented by executive authorities.
- Investigative Dependence on the Executive: Under the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA), 1993, and the National Commission for Women Act, 1990, these commissions lack independent investigation cadres. They rely heavily on police personnel on deputation—the very agencies frequently implicated in human rights and gender-based violations.
- Restricted Jurisdiction and Autonomy: Statutory boundaries impose severe jurisdictional curbs. For example, Section 19 of the PHRA restricts the NHRC from independently investigating human rights violations committed by armed forces, allowing it only to seek reports from the Central Government.
- Budgetary and Staffing Vulnerability: As statutory bodies, their financial allocations, appointment rules, and conditions of service remain vulnerable to executive discretion, undermining functional autonomy.
Examining the Demand: Counter-Perspectives and Practical Realities
- Constitutional Status Is Not a Panacea: Existing constitutional bodies such as the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC, Article 338) and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST, Article 338A) routinely struggle with severe member vacancies, inadequate resources, and long delays in state governments tabling Action Taken Reports (ATRs).
- Proliferation and Institutional Overlap: Creating multiple constitutional silos without systemic coordination can result in jurisdictional friction and institutional fragmentation rather than prompt redressal.
- Enforceability and Judicial Overreach: Conferring binding, adjudicatory, or contempt powers on executive commissions risks blurring the doctrine of separation of powers with the regular judiciary.
Conclusion
Granting constitutional status without addressing deeper operational deficiencies would be a cosmetic reform. The immediate priority must be amending the parent Acts in accordance with the international Paris Principles—guaranteeing dedicated investigative wings, financial autonomy through a consolidated fund charge, and strict statutory timelines for governments to respond to commission advisories.