Introduction
A hung assembly arises when no single political party or pre-poll alliance secures an absolute majority of seats in the legislative assembly following an election. Under Article 164(1) for the appointment of the Chief Minister and Article 174(1) for summoning the House, the Governor exercises situational discretion to facilitate government formation in a fair and non-partisan manner.
Role of the Governor in a Hung Assembly
In the absence of an explicit legislative majority, the Governor is guided by well-established constitutional conventions and judicial precedents rather than personal predilections.
- Order of Preference: The Governor is expected to follow the structured order of preference recommended by the Sarkaria Commission: first, an alliance of parties formed prior to the polls; second, the single largest party claiming to form the government with support from others; third, a post-poll coalition of parties; and finally, a post-poll alliance where some join the ministry while others extend external support.
- Primacy of the Floor Test: In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court ruled conclusively that the assessment of majority strength must take place exclusively on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, not via subjective headcounts or private assessments conducted inside Raj Bhavan.
Concerns for Democracy and Federalism
The partisan exercise of gubernatorial discretion fundamentally impairs the constitutional machinery.
- Erosion of Democratic Norms: Arbitrarily inviting a minority claimant or granting prolonged windows before conducting a floor test invites horse-trading and legislative corruption, undermining the spirit of the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law). In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), the Supreme Court invalidated the premature dissolution of an assembly that had been based on the Governor's subjective political appraisals.
- Subversion of Federal Autonomy: When the Governor acts as an active political agent of the Central Government, it disregards the legitimate popular mandate of the State electorate. As reiterated in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Governor cannot act without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers outside specific constitutional exceptions, nor manipulate legislative proceedings to overturn elected state regimes.
Conclusion
To insulate the high constitutional office from partisan politics, the Punchhi Commission's recommendation to codify a binding procedure for hung assemblies should be adopted. Additionally, institutionalising mandatory floor tests within 24 to 48 hours, as practiced in recent Supreme Court interventions, is essential to protect democratic sanctity and preserve federal trust.