Introduction
Enacted on the recommendations of the Dileep Singh Bhuria Committee, the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) operationalised Article 243M(4)(b) across Fifth Schedule areas in 10 states. It aimed to transform traditional representative democracy into participatory direct democracy by recognising the customary rights and self-governance capabilities of tribal Gram Sabhas.
Successes in Deepening Grassroots Democracy
PESA marked a paradigm shift in decentralisation by making the Gram Sabha the nucleus of local self-governance and resource administration:
- Ecological and Land Sovereignty: Gram Sabhas gained statutory authority to prevent land alienation and protect ecological habitats. A prominent illustration is the landmark Niyamgiri resolutions (2013) in Odisha, where Dongria Kondh Gram Sabhas exercised a decisive veto to halt bauxite mining in sacred hills.
- Livelihood Emancipation: By conferring ownership rights over Minor Forest Produce (MFP) to Gram Sabhas, PESA fostered economic autonomy. In villages like Mendha Lekha (Maharashtra), community-managed tendu patta and bamboo harvesting have yielded substantial village-controlled sovereign funds.
- Political Representation and Inclusion: The statute mandated 100% reservation for Scheduled Tribe chairpersons across all tiers of Panchayats in Fifth Schedule areas, preventing political capture by non-tribal elites and fostering indigenous leadership.
- Customary Dispute Resolution: The Act formally acknowledged customary law, traditional dispute-resolution practices, and the role of the Gram Sabha in managing community resources and maintaining peace.
Critical Gaps and Subversions
Despite progressive statutory provisions, the effective implementation of PESA has encountered significant institutional, legal, and bureaucratic bottlenecks:
- 'Consultation' vs 'Consent' Loophole: Under Section 4(i) of PESA, the Gram Sabha is merely required to be 'consulted' prior to land acquisition or resettlement, rather than giving mandatory 'consent'. This ambiguity has frequently allowed state administrations to push industrial and mining projects by bypassing Gram Sabhas or fabricating meeting resolutions.
- Sectoral Legislative Conflict: Central and state laws such as the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act (MMDR), Coal Bearing Areas Act, and the Indian Forest Act frequently supersede PESA provisions. Concurrently, parallel executive bodies like Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMCs) keep de facto forest administration under bureaucratic control.
- Bureaucratic Inertia and Non-Notification of Rules: State-level compliance has remained deeply fractured. Decades after enactment, states have delayed framing implementing rules; for instance, Jharkhand only framed state PESA rules in 2026, while Odisha has prolonged governance under draft guidelines.
- Fiscal and Administrative Paralysis: Gram Sabhas routinely lack untied direct financial allocations, dedicated secretarial personnel, and bilingual legal resources, rendering their expansive statutory powers functionally dormant.
Conclusion
To realise the intended vision of PESA, India must transition from discretionary consultation to legally binding Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), aligning domestic practice with Article 19 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Harmonising sectoral extractive laws with PESA and equipping Gram Sabhas with untied fiscal resources and administrative capacity will convert formal decentralisation into genuine tribal self-rule.