Introduction
In his seminal work 'A Theory of Justice' (1971), John Rawls propounds 'Justice as Fairness' to provide a deontological alternative to utilitarianism. His theory integrates pure procedural justice with substantively egalitarian distribution, aiming to reconcile the classical liberal commitment to individual liberty with the social democratic commitment to equality.
Procedural in Method: Pure Procedural Justice
Rawls relies on the framework of pure procedural justice, wherein no independent standard determines what is just; rather, following a fair, impartial procedure inevitably guarantees a fair outcome.
- The Original Position and Veil of Ignorance: Rawls devises a hypothetical bargaining scenario where rational, mutually disinterested contractors decide foundational principles of justice behind a 'veil of ignorance'. Deprived of contingent knowledge concerning their class, natural endowments, social status, race, and conceptions of the good, arbitrary biases are eliminated from social contract deliberation.
- The Maximin Rule: Operating under severe epistemic uncertainty, rational individuals employ a risk-averse decision heuristic (maximin), seeking to maximize the minimum welfare and ensuring that the worst possible social outcome is as favorable as possible.
Egalitarian in Outcome: The Principles of Justice
Through this impartial procedure, contractors arrive at two fundamental principles governed by strict lexical priority, preventing trade-offs between basic liberties and socio-economic gains:
- Principle of Equal Basic Liberties: Guarantees the most extensive scheme of equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens.
- Fair Equality of Opportunity: Corrects for structural socio-economic disadvantages so that positions are genuinely open to all under fair conditions.
- The Difference Principle: Regulates socio-economic inequalities, stipulating that inequalities are permissible only if they work to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Through what Rawls terms the chain connection, augmenting the prospects of the worst-off enhances the well-being of the whole social structure, treating the distribution of natural talents as a common social asset.
Communitarian Critiques
During the 1980s and 1990s, communitarian political philosophers challenged Rawls' methodological individualism, abstract universalism, and prioritisation of the 'right' over the 'good':
- Michael Sandel (The 'Unencumbered Self'): In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), Sandel contends that Rawls' conception of the moral agent is an ontological impossibility. For Sandel, the self is not prior to its ends; individuals are 'encumbered' and constituted by their constitutive attachments, traditions, and communal bonds (the 'situated self').
- Alasdair MacIntyre (The 'Narrative Self'): In After Virtue (1981), MacIntyre criticizes Rawls' ahistorical rationalism, arguing that moral judgments only make sense within historically grounded, localized traditions. Human beings are essentially storytelling animals whose moral identity is rooted in a narrative context.
- Michael Walzer ('Complex Equality'): In Spheres of Justice (1983), Walzer argues against a singular, universal scheme of primary goods. Different social goods (such as health, political power, and money) carry distinct social meanings within particular communities and must be distributed according to internal, sphere-specific criteria rather than one overarching procedural rule.
- Charles Taylor ('Embedded Self'): Taylor argues against Rawlsian ethical neutrality, positing that human agency flourishes only within a 'matrix' of shared cultural meanings and a communal pursuit of the common good.
Conclusion
In response to communitarian objections, Rawls revised his thesis in 'Political Liberalism' (1993), recasting justice as fairness not as a comprehensive moral or metaphysical doctrine, but as a freestanding 'political' conception capable of commanding an 'overlapping consensus' in pluralist societies. While communitarians successfully highlighted the sociological limits of abstract proceduralism, Rawls' egalitarian baseline remains the foundation of modern liberal-democratic constitutional design.