Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
Cognitivism, in metaethics, posits that moral statements express beliefs that are either true or false. This contrasts with non-cognitivist views like emotivism, which claim moral statements merely express emotions. A significant challenge to cognitivism stems from Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability – the idea that a statement must be capable of being proven false to be meaningful. Moral claims, it is argued, often lack this quality, rendering them cognitively meaningless. This essay will examine whether cognitivists have provided a cogent answer to this objection, analyzing various cognitivist strategies for addressing the falsifiability challenge.
Understanding the Objection
The objection from falsifiability centers on the perceived difficulty of empirically verifying or falsifying moral claims. For instance, the statement “Murder is wrong” doesn’t seem amenable to the same kind of testing as a scientific hypothesis. Unlike “Water boils at 100°C,” there’s no observable phenomenon that could definitively prove or disprove the wrongness of murder. This leads to the conclusion that moral statements are not genuine assertions about the world, and therefore, not meaningfully cognitive.
Cognitivist Responses: Error Theory
J.L. Mackie’s Error Theory is a radical cognitivist response. He agrees that moral statements *aim* to be objective reports, but argues they are systematically false. Mackie contends that objective moral values do not exist in the world, and therefore, all moral claims are ultimately errors. This addresses falsifiability because the claim “Murder is wrong” is false – it presupposes the existence of objective wrongness, which Mackie denies. However, critics argue that Error Theory is self-refuting; if all moral claims are false, then the claim that “objective moral values do not exist” is also false.
Cognitivist Responses: Moral Realism
Moral Realism asserts that moral facts exist independently of our beliefs. Realists attempt to ground moral properties in natural properties, making them empirically investigable. For example, some realists link moral goodness to human flourishing. This allows for potential falsification: if evidence emerged demonstrating that a particular action consistently *hinders* human flourishing, it could falsify the claim that the action is morally good. However, a major challenge for moral realism is explaining how objective moral facts could be causally inert – why they don’t exert a physical influence on the world. Furthermore, disagreement among realists about the grounding of moral facts weakens their position.
Cognitivist Responses: Quasi-Realism
Simon Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism offers a more nuanced approach. He argues that while moral statements aren’t literally true of objective facts, we can *treat* them as if they are, and this is justified by our psychological and linguistic practices. Blackburn suggests that moral language evolved to regulate behavior and express commitments, and that the appearance of objectivity arises from these functions. Quasi-realism acknowledges the lack of objective moral facts but explains why we experience morality as objective. Critics argue that quasi-realism doesn’t truly address the falsifiability objection; it merely explains why we *think* moral statements are falsifiable, not whether they actually are.
Comparing the Responses
| Theory | Falsifiability Response | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Error Theory | Moral claims are false due to the non-existence of moral facts. | Directly addresses falsifiability; avoids commitment to objective values. | Self-refuting; counterintuitive. |
| Moral Realism | Moral facts are grounded in natural properties, making them empirically investigable. | Aligns with common intuitions; offers a potential basis for objective morality. | Difficulty explaining causal inertness of moral facts; disagreement on grounding. |
| Quasi-Realism | Explains the *appearance* of falsifiability through psychological and linguistic factors. | Accounts for our subjective experience of morality; avoids metaphysical commitments. | Doesn’t genuinely address falsifiability; seen as a form of sophisticated non-cognitivism. |
Conclusion
While the objection from falsifiability poses a significant challenge to cognitivism, cognitivists have offered various responses. Error Theory provides a direct, though controversial, solution. Moral Realism attempts to ground morality in the empirical world, but faces difficulties regarding causal inertness. Quasi-Realism offers a compelling explanation of our moral experience, but arguably sidesteps the core issue of falsifiability. Ultimately, whether these responses are “cogent” depends on one’s philosophical commitments. No single response fully resolves the tension between cognitivism and the principle of falsifiability, leaving the debate ongoing.
Answer Length
This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.