Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
G.E. Moore, a prominent figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, is renowned for his defense of common sense against the rising tide of philosophical skepticism. In his seminal 1925 paper, “Proof of an External World,” Moore attempted to refute skepticism by directly asserting the existence of an external world and offering ‘proofs’ based on everyday observations. This approach, however, was immediately met with criticism. The central question is whether Moore’s arguments successfully address skepticism or merely sidestep the fundamental philosophical issues. This answer will examine Moore’s arguments, analyze the criticisms, and evaluate their overall satisfactoriness.
Moore’s Defense of Common Sense
Moore’s defense of common sense rests on the idea that certain propositions are undeniably true, and that skepticism’s denial of these truths is absurd. He identified several such propositions, including “Here is one hand, and here is another,” and “The earth has existed for many years before my birth.” He argued that these propositions are known with a degree of certainty that surpasses any skeptical doubt. His ‘proofs’ weren’t intended as logical deductions, but rather as demonstrations of the obviousness of these truths.
The ‘Proof of an External World’
Moore’s most famous argument involves proving the existence of an external world. He presented three ‘proofs’:
- Proof 1: He held up his hands and stated, “Here is one hand, and here is another.” He then concluded, “Therefore, at least two external objects exist.”
- Proof 2: He argued that because he had felt the ground under his feet in the past, it follows that the ground exists now.
- Proof 3: He asserted that because he had known other people in the past, they must still exist.
Moore believed these proofs were conclusive because the premises were self-evident and the conclusions followed directly from them. He wasn’t attempting to convince someone who genuinely doubted the existence of an external world, but rather to demonstrate that such doubt was irrational.
Criticisms of Moore’s Arguments
The Charge of Circularity
A primary criticism leveled against Moore is that his arguments are circular. Critics argue that Moore assumes the very thing he is trying to prove – the existence of an external world – in his premises. For example, in the hand argument, he assumes the reality of his hands to prove the reality of external objects. This is akin to begging the question.
The Nature of ‘Common Sense’
Another criticism concerns the concept of ‘common sense’ itself. What constitutes common sense is culturally and historically contingent. What seems self-evident to one person or culture may not be to another. Furthermore, common sense can be demonstrably false. For instance, the common-sense belief that the earth is flat was once widely held, but is now known to be incorrect. Therefore, relying on common sense as a foundation for knowledge is problematic.
The Problem of Skepticism Remains
Moore’s arguments fail to address the underlying philosophical problem of skepticism. Skeptics don’t deny the *experience* of having hands or feeling the ground; they question whether these experiences reliably indicate the existence of an external world. Moore’s assertions simply reiterate the experience without addressing the skeptical challenge to its validity. He doesn’t offer a way to overcome the possibility of being systematically deceived, as in Descartes’ evil demon scenario.
Logical vs. Psychological Assertions
Critics like A.J. Ayer pointed out that Moore’s ‘proofs’ are psychological assertions about his own beliefs, rather than logical arguments. He is stating that *he believes* in the existence of an external world, not providing a logical justification for that belief. This shifts the focus from epistemology to psychology, and doesn’t resolve the skeptical problem.
Evaluating the Satisfactoriness of Moore’s Arguments
Moore’s arguments are ultimately unsatisfactory as a definitive refutation of skepticism. While his emphasis on the importance of common sense and the value of everyday experience is valuable, his ‘proofs’ are vulnerable to the criticisms outlined above. They fail to provide a logically sound basis for knowledge and don’t address the core skeptical concerns. However, Moore’s work is not entirely without merit. He effectively highlighted the absurdity of extreme skepticism and reminded philosophers of the importance of grounding philosophical inquiry in the realities of lived experience. His arguments served as a catalyst for further debate and helped to shape the development of analytic philosophy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while G.E. Moore’s defense of common sense is a significant contribution to philosophical discourse, his arguments are not entirely satisfactory in refuting skepticism. The criticisms regarding circularity, the subjective nature of common sense, and the failure to address the root of skeptical doubt are substantial. Nevertheless, Moore’s work remains important for its emphasis on the value of everyday experience and its challenge to the excesses of philosophical doubt, prompting continued reflection on the foundations of knowledge.
Answer Length
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