Can arthāpatti (postulation) be reduced to anumana (inference)? Discuss it from the Mimamsa point of view.

Understanding Anumāṇa and Arthāpatti

Anumāṇa (Inference), as defined by the Nyaya school and adopted by Mimamsa, is the knowledge derived from the relation between the *hetu* (reason/middle term), the *sadhya* (conclusion), and the *paksha* (subject). It follows a three-term structure: A is B because of C. For example, ‘The hill is fiery because it has smoke.’ This is a *vyapti* (universal concomitance) based inference.

Arthāpatti (Postulation), on the other hand, arises from a perplexing situation (*kutaprakaran*). It’s a means of knowledge that establishes a fact which is otherwise unobservable, to remove a contradiction. A classic example is: ‘Devadatta did not drink water, yet he is alive.’ The contradiction is resolved by postulating that he must have drunk water at some other time or place. It doesn’t rely on a universal concomitance but on the necessity of assuming a hidden fact to reconcile conflicting observations.

Comparing the Structures

Both *anumāna* and *arthāpatti* involve a process of reasoning. However, their starting points and logical structures differ significantly. *Anumāṇa* begins with an observation and proceeds to a conclusion based on a known relationship. *Arthāpatti* begins with a contradiction and proceeds to a postulation to resolve it. The structure can be summarized as follows:

Feature	Anumāṇa (Inference)	Arthāpatti (Postulation)
Starting Point	Observation (e.g., smoke)	Contradiction (e.g., no water, yet alive)
Logical Structure	A is B because of C (Vyapti)	X must be true to resolve the contradiction
Reliance on	Universal Concomitance	Necessity of assumption
Nature of Conclusion	Probable/Inferential	Definite (resolves contradiction)

The Mimamsa Perspective on Reducibility

The Mimamsa school generally argues that *arthāpatti* cannot be fully reduced to *anumāna*. While some Mimamsakas acknowledge that *arthāpatti* can be *explained* using inferential principles, they maintain that it possesses a unique epistemic status. The key argument is that *arthāpatti* doesn’t rely on a pre-established *vyapti*. The postulation is not derived from a general rule but is necessitated by the specific contradictory situation.

Furthermore, the *purvapaksha* (initial objection) in *arthāpatti* is not a denial of a *vyapti*, but a denial of the observed fact in the context of the contradiction. For instance, the *purvapaksha* isn’t “smoke doesn’t always indicate fire,” but “Devadatta didn’t drink water.” The *uttarapaksha* (rebuttal) then postulates the unobserved fact to resolve this specific denial. This difference in the nature of the *purvapaksha* and *uttarapaksha* distinguishes *arthāpatti* from *anumāna*.

Some argue that *arthāpatti* can be seen as a special case of *anumāna* where the *hetu* (reason) is the necessity to avoid contradiction. However, Mimamsakas counter that this reduces *arthāpatti* to a mere logical trick rather than a genuine *pramāṇa* that reveals a previously unknown truth.