Does Aristotle treat matter as a 'Substance'? Give reasons for your answer.

Aristotle’s Concept of Substance

For Aristotle, substance is not merely a ‘thing’ but a particular individual existing independently. He distinguishes between two types of substance: primary substance and secondary substance. Primary substance refers to the individual concrete entity – Socrates, this horse, etc. It is the ‘thisness’ of a thing, its unique individuality. Secondary substance is the species or genus to which the primary substance belongs – ‘man’ or ‘horse’. Secondary substance is what allows us to categorize and understand primary substances. Crucially, substance, for Aristotle, is a unity of form and matter.

Aristotle’s Hylomorphic Theory: Matter and Form

Aristotle’s hylomorphism (from the Greek ‘hyle’ meaning matter and ‘morphe’ meaning form) is the cornerstone of his metaphysics. He argues that all physical objects are composites of matter and form. Matter is the ‘stuff’ out of which something is made, the potentiality for being something, while form is the organizing principle that gives matter its actuality and defines what it is. For example, a bronze statue’s matter is the bronze itself, while its form is the shape imposed upon it by the sculptor. Neither matter nor form can exist independently; they are always found together. This is a crucial point when considering whether matter can be a substance.

Matter: Potentiality and Lack of Independent Existence

Aristotle does not consider matter to be a substance in the same way he considers a composite of matter and form to be a substance. Matter, in itself, is pure potentiality. It lacks determinate being and cannot be said to ‘be’ anything specific until it receives a form. He describes matter as ‘indefinite’ and ‘passive’, requiring form to actualize its potential. Consider bronze again: bronze *can* become a statue, a pot, or any number of things, but it is not *actually* any of those things until it is shaped by a form.

The Four Causes and Matter’s Role

Understanding Aristotle’s four causes further clarifies his view of matter. The four causes are: material cause (the matter out of which something is made), formal cause (the form or essence of a thing), efficient cause (the agent that brings something into being), and final cause (the purpose or telos of a thing). While matter is the material cause, it is not the defining characteristic of a substance. The form, which determines *what* a thing is, is more fundamental. The material cause explains *what it is made of*, but not *what it is*.

Secondary Substance and Matter’s Relation

One might argue that matter, as the underlying basis for categorization (e.g., ‘bronze’ as a category), could be considered a secondary substance. However, even here, Aristotle’s view is nuanced. Secondary substance is defined by its form – ‘bronze’ is defined by its metallic properties. Matter itself, devoid of any specific qualities, is too indeterminate to qualify as even a secondary substance. It is the form that allows us to classify and understand matter, not the other way around.

Challenges and Interpretations

Some interpretations suggest that Aristotle’s view of matter is not entirely devoid of being. He acknowledges that matter has a certain ‘resistance’ to form, a kind of inherent potentiality that is not simply nothingness. However, this potentiality is not sufficient to qualify matter as a substance in the Aristotelian sense. A substance must have determinate being, and matter, in its pure state, lacks this.