Why does Wittgenstein reject the possibility of private language?

The Augustinian Picture and its Critique

Wittgenstein begins by critiquing what he calls the “Augustinian picture” of language – the idea that words are names for objects, and we learn language by associating names with the objects they represent. He argues this picture fails to account for the complexities of language use, particularly the role of rules and the social context of learning. If language were simply naming, then following a rule would be a purely internal, subjective process.

Following a Rule and the Problem of Criteria

Wittgenstein argues that following a rule isn’t a matter of an internal mental state, but a social practice. He uses the example of adding – if someone continues a sequence like ‘2, 4, 6…’ what constitutes ‘following the rule’ of adding 2? There are infinitely many possible continuations. The answer isn’t found within the individual, but in the shared practices and criteria of a community.

He posits that any attempt to establish a private criterion for correctness is doomed to failure. If I define ‘pain’ solely by my internal sensation, how can I be sure I’m applying the term consistently over time? There’s no external standard to check against, and my memory of past sensations is itself an interpretation within the language-game.

Language-Games and Public Verifiability

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of ‘language-games’ to illustrate that language isn’t a monolithic system, but a collection of diverse practices embedded in specific forms of life. These games involve rules, conventions, and shared understandings. Meaning arises from participation in these games, not from a correspondence between words and objects.

A private language, by definition, lacks this public dimension. It’s a language where the speaker is the sole judge of correctness. But without public criteria, there’s no way to distinguish between genuine rule-following and arbitrary behavior. The very notion of meaning presupposes the possibility of correction, and correction requires a shared standard – something a private language cannot provide.

The Beetle in a Box Analogy

Wittgenstein famously uses the analogy of a ‘beetle in a box’. Imagine each person has a box containing a beetle, and each claims to know what a ‘beetle’ is based on their private experience. However, since no one can observe another’s beetle, there’s no way to verify whether they are all referring to the same thing. This illustrates that even if everyone *believes* they understand, there’s no objective basis for shared meaning in a private language.

Implications of the Rejection

The rejection of private language has profound implications for our understanding of consciousness, self-knowledge, and the nature of meaning. It suggests that our mental states are not private, inner entities, but are instead publicly observable aspects of our behavior within language-games. It also challenges the traditional Cartesian view of the self as a thinking substance separate from the world.