Explain the early Nyāya definition of perception. Why this definition is considered inadequate by the later Naiyāyikas?

Early Nyaya Definition of Perception

The early Nyaya school defines perception (pratyaksha) as knowledge arising from the contact between the sense organ (indriya) and its corresponding object (vishaya), mediated by the self (atman). This can be represented as:

• Indriya-vishaya-sannikasho jnanam pratyaksham – Knowledge arising from the contact of the sense organ with its object is perception.

This definition emphasizes three essential conditions:

• Sannikasha (Contact): A direct causal contact between the sense organ and the object is necessary. This contact isn’t merely physical proximity but a specific kind of relation enabling knowledge.
• Indriya (Sense Organ): The five sense organs – eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin – are the instruments of perception.
• Jnanam (Knowledge): The resulting awareness or cognition is the perception itself. The ‘self’ (Atman) is the knower, the consciousness that arises from this contact.

This early definition is relatively straightforward and focuses on the immediate, direct experience of an object. It assumes a relatively unmediated relationship between the perceiver and the perceived.

Criticisms by Later Naiyayikas

Later Naiyayikas, particularly those of the Navya-Nyaya school (starting around the 11th century CE), found the early definition inadequate for several reasons:

• Problem of Indeterminate Perception (Avyakta-jnana): The early definition couldn’t explain how we initially perceive an object without knowing its specific qualities. We first perceive ‘this’ (a vague awareness) before identifying it as a ‘pot’ or a ‘cow’. The early definition assumes determinate knowledge arises directly, ignoring this initial indeterminate stage.
• Problem of Error (Bhrama): The early definition doesn’t account for perceptual errors, such as mistaking a rope for a snake. If perception is simply contact-based knowledge, how can we explain illusions where the contact exists, but the knowledge is false?
• Role of Inference in Perception: Later Naiyayikas argued that even in seemingly direct perception, some degree of inference is involved. For example, perceiving color requires inferring that the color is a property of the object, not merely an illusion.
• The Nature of Contact (Sannikasha): The nature of ‘contact’ itself was debated. Is it merely physical proximity, or does it require a specific causal relation? The early definition lacked clarity on this point.

Later Modifications and the Navya-Nyaya View

To address these criticisms, the Navya-Nyaya school proposed a more complex definition of perception. They introduced the concept of ‘three-fold division of perception’:

• Laksana-pratyaksha (Indeterminate Perception): Initial, vague awareness of an object without specific determination of its qualities.
• Pratyabhasa (Error): False perception arising from faulty inference.
• Vyavasayatmaka-pratyaksha (Determinate Perception): Clear and accurate perception with specific determination of the object’s qualities.

The Navya-Nyaya view emphasizes that perception is not a single, instantaneous event but a process involving both indeterminate and determinate stages. They also acknowledged the role of inference in shaping our perceptual experience and developed sophisticated theories to explain perceptual errors. They introduced the concept of ‘svasiddha’ (self-evident) and ‘parasiddha’ (not self-evident) properties, explaining how some qualities are directly perceived while others are inferred.