Given the recent developments in the region, do you think that there is a need to change India's 'No First Use (NFU)' nuclear policy?

Background of India’s No First Use Policy

The NFU policy, as articulated in India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine released in 1999 and subsequently reaffirmed, is predicated on the belief that nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence and that their use would be catastrophic. Key tenets include credible minimum deterrence, massive retaliation capability, and a commitment to non-use unless attacked with nuclear or biological weapons. This policy was intended to build confidence internationally and reduce the risk of accidental or unintended escalation.

Arguments for Revising the NFU Policy

• Changing Regional Dynamics with Pakistan: Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and its ‘first use’ posture raise concerns about a potential limited nuclear exchange. Some argue that NFU leaves India vulnerable to a Pakistani TNW attack, as retaliation would necessarily involve a larger-scale nuclear response.
• Rising Tensions with China: China’s growing military strength, its assertive behavior in border disputes (like the Galwan Valley clash in 2020), and its lack of a declared NFU policy are seen as challenges to India’s security. Some analysts believe that maintaining NFU could constrain India’s response options in a future conflict with China.
• Credibility of Deterrence: Critics argue that the NFU policy lacks credibility, particularly in scenarios involving conventional attacks that could cripple India’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. A ‘first use’ option, even if not explicitly stated, could enhance deterrence by raising the stakes for potential adversaries.
• Strategic Ambiguity: Some suggest moving towards a policy of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ without explicitly stating NFU, creating strategic ambiguity that could deter potential aggressors.

Arguments Against Revising the NFU Policy

• Global Image and Responsibility: Abandoning NFU would damage India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear power and could trigger a regional arms race. It would be seen as a departure from India’s long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament.
• Escalation Risks: A ‘first use’ policy could increase the risk of accidental or unintended escalation, particularly in a crisis situation. The threshold for nuclear use would be lowered, making miscalculation more likely.
• Strategic Stability: NFU contributes to strategic stability by reducing the incentive for a preemptive strike. Revising the policy could create a ‘use it or lose it’ mentality, increasing instability.
• Retaliatory Capability: India possesses a robust second-strike capability, ensuring that any nuclear attack would be met with a devastating response. This capability provides sufficient deterrence even with an NFU policy.

Regional and Global Implications

A shift in India’s NFU policy would have significant repercussions. Regionally, it could trigger a response from Pakistan, potentially leading to a nuclear arms race and increased instability. China might also reassess its own nuclear posture. Globally, it could undermine efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The international community would likely express concern and pressure India to reconsider its decision. The impact on India’s relations with nuclear weapon states, particularly the US, would also need to be considered.

Policy	Potential Consequences
Maintain NFU	Continued international goodwill, reduced escalation risk, potential vulnerability to TNW attack.
Revise NFU	Enhanced deterrence (potentially), increased escalation risk, damage to international image, regional arms race.
Strategic Ambiguity	Increased deterrence, potential for miscalculation, requires careful signaling.