UPSC MainsECONOMICS-PAPER-I202015 Marks
Q10.

Suppose that we have only two firms in the market with constant marginal costs of C₁ and C₂ respectively such that C₁ > C₂. What is the Bertrand equilibrium in this market? How is it different from the competitive equilibrium?

How to Approach

This question tests understanding of game theory, specifically the Bertrand model of price competition, and its implications for market outcomes. The answer should clearly define the Bertrand equilibrium, explain how it arises given the cost structures, and then contrast it with the outcome under perfect competition. Focus on the key difference: price equals marginal cost in both, but the *process* to get there differs significantly. Structure the answer by first defining Bertrand competition, then detailing the equilibrium, and finally comparing it to competitive equilibrium.

Model Answer

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Introduction

Bertrand competition, a model of oligopoly developed by Joseph Bertrand in 1883, focuses on firms competing on price. Unlike Cournot competition which focuses on quantity, Bertrand assumes firms have identical or differentiated products and compete by setting prices. This model is particularly relevant in understanding markets where consumers are highly price-sensitive and firms can easily switch production. The question asks us to analyze the Bertrand equilibrium in a duopoly with differing marginal costs and contrast it with the outcome under perfect competition, highlighting the nuances of price competition.

Bertrand Equilibrium with Differing Marginal Costs

The Bertrand model assumes firms simultaneously set prices. Consumers purchase from the firm offering the lowest price. If prices are equal, demand is split. In a market with two firms, Firm 1 with marginal cost C₁ and Firm 2 with marginal cost C₂ where C₁ > C₂.

Deriving the Equilibrium

  • Firm 1’s Strategy: Firm 1 will never set a price below C₂. If it does, it will incur losses.
  • Firm 2’s Strategy: Firm 2 will undercut Firm 1’s price as long as the resulting price is above its own marginal cost, C₂.
  • The Outcome: The equilibrium occurs when Firm 1 sets its price equal to C₂ and Firm 2 sets its price equal to C₂. Firm 2 serves the entire market. Firm 1 makes zero profit.

This is because if Firm 1 priced above C₂, Firm 2 would undercut it and capture the entire market. If Firm 1 priced at C₂, Firm 2 would be indifferent between matching the price and capturing half the market or slightly undercutting and capturing the whole market. However, any slight undercutting by Firm 2 would be matched by Firm 1, leading to a price war. The stable outcome is for Firm 1 to accept the market price of C₂.

Competitive Equilibrium

In a perfectly competitive market, numerous firms compete, and no single firm has market power. The equilibrium price is driven down to the marginal cost of the most efficient firm. In this case, the competitive equilibrium price would be C₂.

Comparing Bertrand and Competitive Equilibrium

While both equilibria result in a price of C₂, the *process* by which this price is reached is fundamentally different.

Feature Bertrand Equilibrium Competitive Equilibrium
Number of Firms Two (Duopoly) Many
Price C₂ (lower cost firm’s marginal cost) C₂ (lower cost firm’s marginal cost)
Market Share Firm 2 captures the entire market; Firm 1 has zero share. Market share is distributed among many firms.
Process Strategic interaction and potential undercutting. Firm 1 accepts the price of C₂. Price is determined by market supply and demand, with firms being price takers.
Profit Firm 1 earns zero profit; Firm 2 earns non-negative profit. Firms earn zero economic profit in the long run.

The Bertrand model demonstrates that even with only two firms, price competition can drive the price down to the competitive level. However, this outcome relies on the strategic interaction between firms. In perfect competition, the outcome arises from the collective actions of many firms responding to market signals, not from explicit strategic behavior. The Bertrand paradox highlights that price competition can be more intense than quantity competition.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Bertrand equilibrium with differing marginal costs results in the lower-cost firm capturing the entire market at a price equal to its marginal cost, while the higher-cost firm exits the market or produces nothing. Although the final price is the same as in a perfectly competitive market, the underlying mechanisms are distinct. The Bertrand model emphasizes the power of price competition even with limited market participants, while perfect competition relies on the atomistic behavior of numerous firms. This distinction is crucial for understanding real-world market dynamics and the effectiveness of competition policy.

Answer Length

This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.

Additional Resources

Key Definitions

Bertrand Paradox
The Bertrand Paradox refers to the surprising result that even with only two firms, price competition can drive the price down to the competitive level, even if firms have different costs. This contradicts the intuition that oligopolies would result in higher prices.
Marginal Cost
Marginal cost is the change in the total cost that arises when the quantity produced is incremented by one unit; that is, it is the cost of producing one more unit of a good.

Key Statistics

According to a 2018 report by the OECD, approximately 60% of OECD countries have competition laws prohibiting anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant market positions.

Source: OECD (2018), Competition Assessment Toolkit

The Indian cement industry is dominated by a few major players, with the top 5 companies accounting for over 60% of the total installed capacity as of 2023.

Source: ICRA Limited, Industry Report (2023)

Examples

Airline Industry

The airline industry often exhibits Bertrand competition, particularly on popular routes. Airlines frequently match or undercut each other's prices to attract passengers, leading to price wars and reduced fares. This is especially evident with low-cost carriers challenging established airlines.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happens if the two firms have identical marginal costs?

If the two firms have identical marginal costs (C₁ = C₂), the Bertrand equilibrium becomes unstable. Both firms will have an incentive to undercut each other, leading to a price war and ultimately driving the price down to the common marginal cost. They will split the market equally.