UPSC MainsPHILOSOPHY-PAPER-I202010 Marks150 Words
Q17.

Why is memory not a valid knowledge according to Mīmāmsā?

How to Approach

This question requires a nuanced understanding of Mīmāmsā epistemology. The approach should focus on explaining Mīmāmsā’s theory of knowledge (pramāṇas) and then specifically demonstrate why memory (smṛti) doesn’t qualify as a valid source of knowledge (pramāṇa) within that framework. Key points to cover include the Mīmāmsā emphasis on direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), the fallibility of memory, and its derivative nature. Structure the answer by first outlining Mīmāmsā’s pramāṇas, then detailing the critique of smṛti, and finally, briefly summarizing the implications.

Model Answer

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Introduction

Mīmāmsā, a school of Hindu philosophy, is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Vedas and the performance of Vedic rituals. Central to its system is a robust theory of epistemology, outlining valid sources of knowledge (pramāṇas) that allow for accurate understanding of the Vedic injunctions. Mīmāmsā recognizes only two pramāṇas: pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāna (inference). While memory (smṛti) plays a role in human cognition, Mīmāmsā explicitly rejects it as a reliable source of knowledge, deeming it incapable of providing certainty required for correct Vedic interpretation and action. This rejection stems from the school’s rigorous standards for establishing truth and its focus on demonstrable validity.

Mīmāmsā’s Theory of Knowledge (Pramāṇas)

Mīmāmsā’s epistemology is fundamentally realist, asserting the objective existence of the world and the possibility of attaining accurate knowledge about it. The two accepted pramāṇas are:

  • Pratyakṣa (Perception): This refers to direct sensory experience. Mīmāmsā emphasizes immediate and non-erroneous perception as the foundational source of knowledge.
  • Anumāṇa (Inference): This is a process of reasoning from observed facts to a conclusion. Mīmāmsā defines inference as a synthetic knowledge arising from the relation between the reason (hetu) and the fact (sādhya). It’s a logically valid process, governed by specific rules.

Why Memory (Smṛti) is Not a Pramāṇa

Mīmāmsā rejects memory as a valid source of knowledge for several key reasons:

  • Derivative Nature: Mīmāmsā considers memory to be dependent on prior perception (pratyakṣa). Memory doesn’t *create* knowledge; it merely *reproduces* knowledge already acquired through perception. Since it’s derivative, it cannot be considered an independent source of knowledge.
  • Fallibility: Memory is prone to errors, distortions, and omissions. Mīmāmsā insists that a valid pramāṇa must be infallible. The possibility of inaccurate recollection disqualifies memory from being a reliable source of knowledge.
  • Lack of Svataḥpramāṇatva (Self-Validity): A true pramāṇa possesses svataḥpramāṇatva – the inherent capacity to validate itself. Perception and inference, according to Mīmāmsā, are self-validating. Memory, however, requires external corroboration to confirm its accuracy.
  • Role in Ritual Action: The Mīmāmsā school is deeply concerned with the correct performance of Vedic rituals. Reliance on fallible memory for understanding Vedic injunctions and executing rituals could lead to errors and invalidate the ritual’s efficacy.

Distinction between Smṛti (Memory) and Śruti (Vedic Revelation)

It’s crucial to distinguish between ‘smṛti’ as memory and ‘Smṛti’ as the body of traditional texts (like the Dharmaśāstras) derived from the Vedas. While the latter is considered authoritative, it’s ultimately grounded in the original Vedic revelation (Śruti). Mīmāmsā prioritizes Śruti as the ultimate source of dharma and knowledge, and Smṛti texts are valid only to the extent they align with Śruti. Individual memory, however, lacks this foundational authority.

Example: Remembering a Vedic Mantra

If someone remembers a Vedic mantra, that memory is not, in itself, knowledge of the mantra. The knowledge originated from hearing (perception) of the mantra from a teacher. The memory is merely a recollection of that prior perception. To ensure the mantra is recited correctly, one must refer back to the authoritative source (the teacher or the Vedic text) and verify the memory.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mīmāmsā’s rejection of memory as a valid source of knowledge stems from its stringent epistemological criteria. The school prioritizes direct perception and logically sound inference as the only reliable means of attaining knowledge, particularly concerning the interpretation of the Vedas. Memory, being derivative, fallible, and lacking self-validity, fails to meet these standards. This emphasis on demonstrable certainty underscores Mīmāmsā’s commitment to accurate understanding and the correct performance of Vedic rituals, which are considered essential for achieving desired outcomes.

Answer Length

This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.

Additional Resources

Key Definitions

Pramāṇa
A valid source of knowledge; a means of acquiring reliable and certain knowledge. In Mīmāmsā, only pratyakṣa and anumāna are considered pramāṇas.
Svataḥpramāṇatva
Self-validity; the inherent capacity of a valid source of knowledge to validate itself without requiring external corroboration. Pratyakṣa and Anumāṇa are considered to possess this quality in Mīmāmsā.

Key Statistics

The Mīmāmsā Sūtras, the foundational text of the school, contain approximately 1160 sūtras (aphorisms) covering a wide range of topics, including epistemology, ritual, and language.

Source: Various commentaries on the Mīmāmsā Sūtras

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a prominent Mīmāmsā philosopher, authored the Ślokavārttika, a comprehensive commentary on the Mīmāmsā Sūtras, consisting of over 2400 verses.

Source: Historical accounts of Indian Philosophy

Examples

Identifying a Cow

According to Mīmāmsā, knowing a cow is a cow comes from perceiving its characteristics (horns, tail, etc.) – pratyakṣa. If someone remembers seeing a cow earlier, that memory doesn’t constitute knowledge unless it’s corroborated by current perception or a valid inference.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Mīmāmsā completely disregard the role of memory?

No, Mīmāmsā acknowledges the practical importance of memory in daily life. However, it doesn’t consider it a source of *knowledge* in the epistemological sense. Memory is useful for recalling past experiences, but it cannot provide certainty or justify beliefs.

Topics Covered

ReligionPhilosophyMīmāmsāMemoryKnowledgePratyakshaAnumana