Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
Edmund Husserl, a pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, revolutionized the study of consciousness with his development of phenomenology. Central to his project is a rigorous critique of what he termed the ‘natural attitude’ – the pre-reflective, everyday way in which we experience the world. This attitude, characterized by a taken-for-granted acceptance of the world’s existence and our place within it, is, according to Husserl, the source of philosophical difficulties. Husserl believed that by systematically suspending our belief in the external world, through a process called the *epoché*, we could access the pure phenomena of consciousness and establish philosophy as a rigorous science. This answer will critically examine Husserl’s criticism of the natural attitude and how he proposes to overcome its limitations through his phenomenological method.
The ‘Natural Attitude’ and its Problems
The ‘natural attitude’, as Husserl describes it, is the fundamental orientation we have towards the world in our daily lives. It’s a pre-theoretical stance where we assume the existence of an objective reality independent of our consciousness. We perceive objects as having inherent properties and existing in space and time, without questioning the validity of these perceptions. This attitude is ‘natural’ because it’s spontaneous and unreflective; it’s how we typically engage with the world.
However, Husserl argues that this natural attitude is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it presupposes the existence of the external world, which is precisely what philosophy should investigate, not assume. Secondly, it leads to a ‘naive realism’ where we mistake our subjective experiences for objective reality. This obscures the true nature of consciousness and prevents us from understanding the structures that constitute our experience. Thirdly, it hinders genuine philosophical inquiry by taking the world for granted, preventing a critical examination of its foundations. Husserl believed that this uncritical acceptance of the world leads to skepticism and ultimately, a failure to grasp the essence of being.
Husserl’s Critique of the Natural Attitude
Husserl’s critique isn’t simply a rejection of everyday experience. He doesn’t deny the existence of the world, but rather questions our *access* to it. He argues that our experience is always mediated by consciousness, and that the natural attitude obscures this fundamental fact. The natural attitude, he contends, is a ‘province’ of being, but not being itself. It’s a way of relating to being, but it doesn’t reveal being’s essential structure.
He identifies several key features of the natural attitude that contribute to its problematic nature:
- The Thesis of the World: The unquestioned assumption that the world exists independently of our consciousness.
- Typification: The tendency to categorize and generalize our experiences, leading to a loss of individual nuance.
- Habitualization: The formation of ingrained patterns of perception and thought that limit our openness to new experiences.
The Phenomenological Method: Transcending the Natural Attitude
To overcome the limitations of the natural attitude, Husserl proposes a radical methodological shift: phenomenology. The core of this method is the *epoché* (Greek for ‘suspension’), also known as the phenomenological reduction. The *epoché* involves bracketing or suspending our belief in the existence of the external world – not denying it, but setting it aside as a question. This isn’t a skeptical move, but a methodological one. By suspending our natural assumptions, we can focus on the pure phenomena of consciousness – the ‘what’ of experience, rather than the ‘that’ it exists.
The phenomenological reduction unfolds in several stages:
- Epoché: Suspending judgment about the existence of the external world.
- Phenomenological Reduction: Focusing on the pure phenomena of consciousness, stripping away all presuppositions.
- Eidetic Reduction: Identifying the essential structures (essences) of phenomena through imaginative variation. This involves systematically altering aspects of a phenomenon in our imagination to determine which features are essential to its identity.
Through these reductions, Husserl aims to arrive at a ‘transcendental subjectivity’ – a realm of pure consciousness that is the foundation of all experience. This transcendental subjectivity is not a personal self, but a universal structure of consciousness that makes experience possible.
Applying the Phenomenological Method
Consider the experience of perceiving a table. In the natural attitude, we simply see a table – a solid, brown object with four legs. However, through the phenomenological reduction, we bracket our belief in the table’s existence and focus on the *way* it appears to us. We analyze the sensory data – the colors, shapes, textures – and the way these data are organized in our consciousness. We then use the eidetic reduction to identify the essential features of ‘tableness’ – what makes a table a table, regardless of its specific characteristics. This process reveals the structures of intentionality – the directedness of consciousness towards an object – and the way our consciousness constitutes the meaning of the table.
Husserl believed that by applying the phenomenological method to various phenomena, we could uncover the fundamental structures of consciousness and establish a rigorous foundation for philosophy. He envisioned phenomenology as a ‘descriptive psychology’ that would reveal the essential features of human experience.
Conclusion
Husserl’s critique of the natural attitude and his proposed phenomenological method represent a profound challenge to traditional philosophical approaches. While the *epoché* and the reductions are demanding and arguably difficult to fully implement, they offer a powerful tool for investigating the nature of consciousness and experience. His work laid the groundwork for existentialism and other influential philosophical movements. Despite criticisms regarding its potential for solipsism and the difficulty of achieving a truly ‘bracketed’ perspective, Husserl’s phenomenology remains a vital and influential force in contemporary philosophy, offering a unique pathway to understanding the foundations of knowledge and being.
Answer Length
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