What, according to Mimāmsakas, is the ontological status of abhāva (absence) and how does one know it? Explain and examine.

Ontological Status of Abhava in Mimamsa

Mimamsakas categorize abhava into four distinct types, each possessing a unique ontological status. These are:

• Pragabhava (Prior Absence): Absence of something *before* its production. For example, the absence of a pot before the pot is made. This is considered real because it is the condition for the pot’s subsequent existence.
• Drasyabhava (Post Absence): Absence of something *after* its destruction. For example, the absence of a pot after it is broken. This is also considered real, as it is the condition for the pot’s non-existence.
• Anyatavabhava (Absolute Absence): Absence of something from a particular place. For example, the absence of a cow in a pond. This is considered unreal, as it merely indicates the non-existence of a cow *in that specific location*, not its absolute non-existence.
• Vyavaharabhava (Functional Absence): Absence considered from the point of view of practical transactions. This is also considered unreal, as it is dependent on our perception and usage.

The key point is that Pragabhava and Drasyabhava are considered objectively real (sat) entities, not merely logical negations (asat). They are not simply the lack of something; they are positive realities that condition existence and non-existence. This is a departure from the Nyaya school, which views absence as a property of the locus (e.g., the space where the pot *should* be) and not an independent entity.

Epistemological Justification: How is Abhava Known?

The Mimamsakas argue that abhava is directly perceived (pratyaksha) through a unique type of perception called abhava-pratyaksha. This isn’t perception of a positive entity, but rather perception of the *lack* of a positive entity. However, this perception isn’t arbitrary. It’s grounded in the following:

• Contrast with Positive Knowledge: We perceive abhava by contrasting the expected presence of something with its actual absence. For instance, we perceive the absence of a pot in a room because we have prior knowledge of what a pot is and where it might typically be found.
• Inference (Anumana): Abhava can also be inferred from the presence of certain effects. For example, if we see broken pieces of a pot, we infer the absence of the intact pot. This inference relies on the causal relationship between the pot and its fragments.
• Vedic Authority (Shabda): The Vedas often prescribe actions to remove or prevent abhava. For example, Vedic injunctions aim to remove the absence of desired results (like prosperity) through the performance of rituals. The very fact that the Vedas address abhava implies its reality and knowability.

The Mimamsakas address the objection that we cannot perceive what is not there. They argue that we perceive the *absence of* something, which is a distinct perceptual experience. They draw an analogy to darkness – we don’t perceive darkness as a positive entity, but as the absence of light, yet we undeniably experience it.

Comparison with Other Schools

The Nyaya school, in contrast, treats absence (abhava) as a property (dharma) of the locus where something is expected to be. It doesn’t grant abhava independent ontological status. Buddhists, particularly the Sarvastivadins, accept the reality of past and future, but generally deny the reality of absence. The Advaita Vedanta school views abhava as maya (illusion), a product of ignorance, and not ultimately real. The Mimamsa position, therefore, is quite unique in its assertion of the objective reality of certain types of absence.

School	Ontological Status of Abhava	Epistemological Justification
Mimamsa	Pragabhava & Drasyabhava are real; Anyatavabhava & Vyavaharabhava are unreal	Direct perception (abhava-pratyaksha), Inference, Vedic Authority
Nyaya	Property (dharma) of the locus	Inference
Advaita Vedanta	Maya (illusion)	Not ultimately real; a product of ignorance