Do you think Moore's arguments provide a sufficient response to objections presented by the sceptic against the possibility of knowledge ? Give reasons in support of your answer.

The Skeptical Challenge

The skeptical challenge, in its various forms, fundamentally questions our ability to justify our beliefs about the external world. A core argument revolves around the possibility of systematic deception – the idea that our sensory experiences could be radically misleading, perhaps orchestrated by a ‘malicious demon’ (as Descartes posited) or stemming from a brain-in-a-vat scenario. This leads to the problem of justification: how can we be certain that our beliefs correspond to reality if our access to reality is mediated by potentially unreliable senses? The skeptic doesn’t necessarily claim that an external world *doesn’t* exist, but rather that we have no rational grounds for believing that it *does*.

Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’

G.E. Moore, in his 1939 paper “Proof of an External World,” directly confronted this skepticism. He argued that we can *prove* the existence of an external world by performing simple, everyday actions. His famous ‘proofs’ involved holding up his hands and declaring, “Here is one hand, and here is another. Therefore, at least two external objects exist.” He offered similar proofs based on observing patches of blue or knowing that it is midday. Moore’s strategy wasn’t to offer new evidence for the external world, but to demonstrate that we already *know* it exists, and that this knowledge is sufficient to establish its truth. He believed that the skeptic’s demand for further justification was misguided, as the very act of questioning presupposes the existence of the world being questioned.

Analyzing Moore’s Method: Common Sense and Primitive Facts

Moore’s approach is rooted in his philosophical commitment to ‘common sense’. He believed that certain beliefs are so fundamental and self-evident that they don’t require further justification. These are what he termed ‘primitive facts’ – facts that are known directly and intuitively. For Moore, the existence of our hands, or the perception of color, are such facts. He argued that the skeptic’s insistence on absolute certainty ignores the practical and intuitive nature of everyday knowledge. He wasn’t attempting to provide a logically airtight argument, but rather to remind us of what we already know with certainty.

Objections to Moore’s Arguments

Despite its intuitive appeal, Moore’s argument faces significant objections. The most prominent is the regress argument. If the skeptic challenges Moore’s claim that he *knows* he has hands, Moore must offer justification for that knowledge. But any justification he offers will itself be subject to skeptical doubt, leading to an infinite regress. The skeptic can simply ask, “How do you *know* that you know you have hands?” and Moore’s response will require further justification, and so on.

Another objection concerns the problem of justification. Even if we accept that we have immediate awareness of our hands, this doesn’t necessarily prove the existence of an external world. It could be argued that we are merely aware of sensations *in our minds*, and that these sensations don’t guarantee a corresponding external reality. Moore’s proofs, therefore, seem to shift the focus from proving the existence of an external world to proving that we *know* an external world exists, which is a different, and arguably weaker, claim.

Does Moore Sufficiently Respond to Skepticism?

While Moore’s arguments don’t definitively *refute* skepticism, they do offer a powerful and insightful response. He effectively exposes the absurdity of demanding absolute certainty in everyday life. The skeptic’s insistence on radical doubt seems disconnected from the practical realities of human experience. Moore’s emphasis on common sense reminds us that knowledge is often grounded in intuitive beliefs and practical interactions with the world. However, the regress argument and the problem of justification demonstrate that Moore’s proofs don’t provide a logically conclusive answer to the skeptic’s challenge. They are more accurately described as a reaffirmation of our common-sense beliefs than a definitive refutation of skepticism. Moore’s contribution lies in highlighting the limitations of the skeptical project itself, rather than providing a foolproof solution to the problem of knowledge.