UPSC MainsPHILOSOPHY-PAPER-I202115 Marks
Q12.

What according to Strawson are basic particulars ? What reasons does Strawson offer to believe that 'material bodies' and 'persons' are basic particulars? Critically discuss.

How to Approach

This question requires a detailed understanding of P.F. Strawson’s concept of ‘basic particulars’ as presented in his book *Individuals and the Objects*. The answer should begin by defining basic particulars and explaining why Strawson rejects the traditional subject-predicate view of language. It should then elaborate on his reasons for considering ‘material bodies’ and ‘persons’ as basic particulars, focusing on his critique of reductionism. A critical discussion should involve acknowledging potential objections and offering a balanced assessment of Strawson’s arguments. The structure should be: Introduction, Defining Basic Particulars, Reasons for Material Bodies & Persons, Critical Discussion, and Conclusion.

Model Answer

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Introduction

P.F. Strawson, a prominent 20th-century philosopher, challenged traditional metaphysical assumptions about language and reality in his seminal work, *Individuals and the Objects* (1959). He argued against the logical atomism prevalent at the time, particularly the idea that sentences could be reduced to simple subject-predicate forms. Central to his critique is the concept of ‘basic particulars’ – entities that are not definable in terms of other entities and serve as fundamental building blocks of our conceptual scheme. This question asks us to explore Strawson’s notion of basic particulars and his justification for identifying ‘material bodies’ and ‘persons’ as such, followed by a critical evaluation of his stance.

Defining Basic Particulars

Strawson’s concept of basic particulars arises from his critique of descriptive metaphysics. He argues that our language doesn’t function by simply describing a pre-existing reality. Instead, language is fundamentally *performative* – it constitutes reality through our practices and conventions. Basic particulars, according to Strawson, are those entities which occupy a primary place in our conceptual scheme and are not defined by their qualities or properties. They are the subjects of predication, but not themselves predicates. To understand this, we must grasp Strawson’s rejection of the ‘Russellian’ view of language, where every meaningful sentence can be analyzed into a logical form with a subject and predicate, and where subjects are merely logical placeholders.

Reasons for Considering Material Bodies as Basic Particulars

Strawson contends that material bodies are basic particulars because our primary way of identifying and re-identifying objects in the world is through their spatiotemporal continuity. We track objects as they move through space and time, and this tracking is not based on any underlying essence or set of properties. He argues that attempts to reduce material bodies to collections of sense-data (as empiricists like Locke suggested) or to bundles of properties (as some metaphysicians proposed) are ultimately unsuccessful.

  • Spatiotemporal Continuity: We identify a chair not by its color, shape, or material, but by its continued existence in space and time.
  • Primitive Reference: Our references to material bodies are primitive and not dependent on descriptive content. We simply point and say "That is a chair," without needing to specify all its properties.
  • Rejection of Reductionism: Strawson rejects the idea that material bodies can be reduced to something more fundamental, like particles or energy.

Reasons for Considering Persons as Basic Particulars

Strawson extends the concept of basic particulars to persons, arguing that our understanding of human beings is similarly not reducible to their mental or physical properties. He emphasizes the importance of the ‘human form of life’ – the network of social practices, attitudes, and expectations that shape our understanding of ourselves and others.

  • Unique Predicative Patterns: We apply a unique range of predicates to persons – predicates relating to intentions, beliefs, emotions, and moral responsibility – that are not applicable to material objects.
  • The Concept of a Person: The very concept of a person is tied to notions of agency, self-consciousness, and moral accountability, which cannot be reduced to purely physical or behavioral terms.
  • Mutual Recognition: Our understanding of persons is fundamentally intersubjective. We recognize each other as persons through reciprocal recognition and engagement in shared practices.

Critical Discussion

Strawson’s arguments have been subject to considerable debate. One major criticism comes from those who advocate for physicalism or materialism, who argue that persons *are* ultimately reducible to their physical properties. They contend that mental states are simply brain states, and that there is no need to posit a separate, non-physical realm of persons. Another criticism concerns the vagueness of the concept of ‘basic particulars’ itself. Critics argue that it is unclear what criteria determine whether something is truly basic, and that Strawson’s account relies on intuitive notions that are difficult to justify philosophically.

However, Strawson’s position has significant strengths. His emphasis on the importance of language and social practices in shaping our understanding of reality provides a valuable corrective to overly abstract and reductionist approaches to metaphysics. His critique of descriptive metaphysics highlights the performative aspect of language and the role of convention in constituting our world. Furthermore, his insistence on the irreducibility of persons resonates with our everyday experience of ourselves and others as agents with intentions, beliefs, and moral responsibilities.

Argument Criticism Strawson's Response (Implicit)
Material bodies are basic particulars due to spatiotemporal continuity. Physicalism argues bodies are reducible to particles. Reduction loses the practical, everyday understanding of objects.
Persons are basic particulars due to unique predicative patterns. Materialism claims mental states are brain states. This ignores the qualitative experience and intentionality of consciousness.

Conclusion

Strawson’s concept of basic particulars offers a compelling alternative to traditional metaphysical approaches. By emphasizing the primacy of our conceptual schemes and the irreducibility of certain entities like material bodies and persons, he challenges us to rethink our understanding of language, reality, and ourselves. While his arguments are not without their critics, his work remains highly influential in contemporary philosophy, particularly in areas such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. His insistence on the importance of context and practice provides a valuable framework for navigating the complexities of human experience and understanding.

Answer Length

This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.

Additional Resources

Key Definitions

Descriptive Metaphysics
The view that metaphysics aims to describe a pre-existing reality independently of our conceptual schemes and linguistic practices.
Performative Utterance
An utterance that does not simply describe a state of affairs but actually *performs* an action, such as promising, declaring, or naming.

Key Statistics

According to a 2023 Pew Research Center study, 63% of Americans believe in a soul, suggesting an intuitive acceptance of the non-reducibility of persons.

Source: Pew Research Center, 2023

The global AI market is projected to reach $1.84 trillion by 2030 (Statista, 2024), highlighting the increasing relevance of questions about AI and personhood.

Source: Statista, 2024

Examples

The Ship of Theseus

This thought experiment illustrates the problem of identity over time and challenges the idea that objects can be defined solely by their constituent parts. It supports Strawson’s view that identity is based on spatiotemporal continuity rather than essential properties.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Strawson deny the existence of properties altogether?

No, Strawson doesn't deny the existence of properties. He argues that properties are predicated *of* basic particulars, and that our understanding of properties is dependent on our prior understanding of the particulars to which they are attributed.

Topics Covered

Philosophy20th Century PhilosophyStrawsonParticularsMetaphysicsReference