"By the time of 1932 elections, Germany's ruling classes began to feel that the only way to escape from a deep economic crisis was to hand over political power to a totalitarian agency.” Explain.

Germany's Deep Economic Crisis by 1932

The German economy in 1932 was in a state of catastrophic collapse, primarily triggered by the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and Germany's heavy reliance on American loans under the Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929). When these loans were recalled, Germany's economy spiraled downwards:

• Massive Unemployment: By January 1933, unemployment soared to an estimated 6.1 million people, representing about 26% of the workforce. Industrial production plummeted by 40% between 1929 and 1932.
• Industrial and Banking Collapse: German banks suffered immense losses, leading to widespread closures. Businesses either drastically reduced production or shut down, leading to further job losses and a decline in wages (a 39% fall from 1929 to 1932).
• Failed Austerity Measures: Chancellor Heinrich Brüning's austerity policies (1930-1932), which involved cutting government spending, increasing taxes, and reducing unemployment benefits, exacerbated the economic hardship and earned him the moniker "Hunger Chancellor."
• Reparations Burden: Although reparations were eventually suspended at the Lausanne Conference in July 1932, the perception of their debilitating effect on the German economy persisted, fueling anti-Weimar sentiment.

Disillusionment with the Weimar Republic and Fear of Communism

The continuous economic and political instability of the Weimar Republic led to widespread disillusionment among the German populace and, critically, among the ruling classes:

• Weak Coalition Governments: The proportional representation system often resulted in weak coalition governments unable to command a stable majority in the Reichstag. Between 1919 and 1932, there were frequent changes in government, making effective governance challenging.
• Increased Use of Article 48: President Hindenburg increasingly resorted to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, allowing him to pass emergency decrees without parliamentary consent. This undermined democratic processes and signaled the failure of parliamentary rule.
• Rise of Extremist Parties: The economic hardship and political paralysis fueled the growth of both right-wing (Nazis) and left-wing (Communists) extremist parties. In the July 1932 elections, the Nazis became the largest party with 37.3% of the vote, while the Communist Party also gained seats.
• Fear of Communist Revolution: The ruling classes, including industrialists, landowners, and traditional conservatives, harbored an intense fear of a communist revolution, similar to that in Russia. They viewed the growing strength of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) as a direct threat to their property, social order, and capitalist system.

Ruling Classes' Turn Towards Totalitarianism

In this climate of economic despair and political fragmentation, many within the ruling classes began to see a totalitarian agency as a necessary evil or even a desirable solution:

1. Desire for Stability and Order:

• They believed that only a strong, authoritarian government could restore law and order, curb civil unrest, and effectively tackle the economic crisis, which the democratic government seemed incapable of doing.
• The Weimar Republic's inability to form stable majorities and its reliance on presidential decrees highlighted its perceived ineffectiveness.

2. Protection of Economic Interests:

• Industrialists and business leaders, fearing nationalization or greater state control under a socialist or communist government, saw the Nazis as a bulwark against such threats. While the Nazis had some socialist rhetoric, their anti-communist stance and promises of economic revival appealed to these elites.
• They sought a regime that would prioritize business interests, end strikes, and ensure industrial peace, which a strong state could enforce.

3. Anti-Communism as a Unifying Factor:

• The Nazi Party's aggressive anti-communist platform resonated deeply with the conservative elite. They viewed Hitler as a figure who could decisively crush the communist movement.
• Many believed they could "use" Hitler to destroy the political left and then control him or replace him with a more amenable conservative leader.

4. Traditional Authoritarian Tendencies:

• Sections of the old Prussian aristocracy, military leaders, and civil servants had never fully embraced the democratic principles of the Weimar Republic. They yearned for a return to the authoritarian structures of the imperial era.
• Figures like former Chancellor Franz von Papen and President Paul von Hindenburg, despite their initial reluctance towards Hitler, eventually saw him as a tool to establish a more conservative, authoritarian government. Von Papen, in particular, played a crucial role in persuading Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933, believing he could be controlled.

5. Propaganda and Perceived Strength:

• The Nazi Party, under Joseph Goebbels, employed highly effective propaganda, promising national renewal, economic recovery, and a return to German greatness. This message resonated with a population weary of crisis and humiliation.
• The disciplined appearance and paramilitary strength of the SA (Sturmabteilung) projected an image of decisive action and order, which contrasted sharply with the perceived chaos of parliamentary politics.

In essence, by 1932, a significant segment of Germany's ruling classes, driven by a complex mix of economic anxieties, fear of communism, and a preference for authoritarian stability, began to believe that handing over political power to a totalitarian agency like the Nazi Party, despite its radical elements, was the only practical solution to rescue Germany from its deep economic and political quagmire.