Introduction
The concept of the 'Decline of Legislature', famously articulated by Lord Bryce, refers to the progressive erosion of legislative authority, autonomy, and deliberative capacity relative to the rising dominance of the executive. In parliamentary democracies, this decline impairs the legislature's primary constitutional function of acting as an effective check on government power.
Factors Responsible for the Decline of Legislature
The diminishing role of the legislature as a forum for deliberation and accountability stems from multiple institutional and political dynamics:
- Executive Aggrandizement: Excessive reliance on executive ordinances under Article 123 and the broad expansion of delegated legislation circumvent substantive floor debates and reduce parliamentary law-making to post-facto ratification.
- Rigidity of the Tenth Schedule: The indiscriminate issuance of party whips under the Anti-Defection Law suppresses intra-party dissent and discourages informed floor debate, reducing individual lawmakers to mere voting machines adhering to party lines.
- Bypassing Committee Scrutiny: Departmentally Related Standing Committees—crucial for non-partisan, clause-by-clause scrutiny—are increasingly bypassed. The proportion of bills referred to committees fell sharply from 71% in the 15th Lok Sabha to just 16% in the 17th Lok Sabha.
- Truncated Sittings and Chronic Disruptions: Persistent disruptions and shrinking legislative calendars have drastically curtailed the time available for scrutiny. The 17th Lok Sabha recorded only 274 sitting days—the lowest for any full five-year term—resulting in major legislation being passed without substantive discussion.
Measures to Prevent the Decline
Restoring legislative pre-eminence and strengthening parliamentary accountability requires institutional and procedural reforms:
- Mandatory Committee Scrutiny: Institutionalise the compulsory referral of all substantive, non-emergency legislative bills to Departmentally Related Standing Committees before their introduction or passage on the floor.
- Statutory Minimum Sittings: Enforce the recommendation of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) to mandate a statutory minimum of 120 annual sitting days for the Lok Sabha and 100 days for the Rajya Sabha.
- Reforming the Whip Mechanism: Adopt the recommendations of the Dinesh Goswami Committee and the Law Commission to restrict the invocation of whips under the Tenth Schedule exclusively to motions of confidence, no-confidence, and money bills, thereby granting legislators freedom of conscience on general bills.
- Institutionalising Opposition Rights: Adopt international conventions, such as dedicated 'Opposition Days' on the lines of the United Kingdom Parliament, guaranteeing the opposition dedicated floor time to set the legislative and deliberative agenda.
- Establishing a Parliamentary Budget Office: Set up an independent, non-partisan Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to equip legislators with specialised technical research and independent fiscal evaluation of executive budgetary demands.
Conclusion
Reclaiming the deliberative vitality and oversight capability of the legislature is indispensable to preventing executive hegemony and preserving constitutional checks and balances. Translating institutional reforms into practice will revitalise parliamentary democracy as the cornerstone of public accountability.