Introduction
Part XX, Article 368 of the Constitution of India synthesizes rigidity and flexibility by outlining the procedure for constitutional amendments. Rather than adopting an entirely flexible system like the United Kingdom or an overly rigid one like the United States, India adopts a multi-tiered approach suited to its diverse federal architecture.
Procedure for Amending the Constitution
The amendment process can be categorized into three distinct modalities:
- Simple Majority of Parliament (Outside Article 368): Certain provisions can be amended by a simple majority (more than 50% of members present and voting), such as the formation of new states or alteration of boundaries under Article 3, creation or abolition of legislative councils, and changes in the Second Schedule. Technically, these are not deemed constitutional amendments under Article 368.
- Special Majority of Parliament (Under Article 368): Most provisions require a special majority in each House of Parliament—a majority of the total membership of each House and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy fall under this category.
- Special Majority along with State Ratification: Amendments touching upon federal structures require a special majority in Parliament plus ratification by the legislatures of at least half of the states by simple majority. Examples include the election of the President, the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States, representation of states in Parliament, and provisions relating to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) introduced via the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act.
Arguments that the Procedure Favours the Centre
Certain structural features tilt the amending power substantially toward the Union:
- Monopoly on Initiation: The power to initiate an amendment bill lies exclusively with Parliament. State legislatures cannot initiate any constitutional amendment bill or resolution.
- Absence of Time Frame: The Constitution prescribes no specific time limit within which states must ratify or reject an amendment bill submitted to them.
- Asymmetry in State Consent: Only a specific subset of federal provisions requires ratification by states; the majority of provisions can be amended by Parliament acting alone.
Institutional and Constitutional Safeguards Against Central Hegemony
Despite central leverage, robust checks prevent the Constitution from becoming a political play-thing:
- Judicial Review and the Basic Structure Doctrine: The landmark ruling in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), reaffirmed in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), established that Parliament cannot alter the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution, including federalism, democracy, and judicial independence.
- Requirement of Separate Majorities: An amendment bill must be passed by both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha separately. Article 368 provides no provision for a joint sitting, giving the Rajya Sabha (representing states) an effective veto.
- Judicial Invalidation of Unilateral Federal Alterations: In Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021), the Supreme Court struck down Part IXB introduced by the 97th Constitutional Amendment Act for matters relating to intra-state co-operative societies because it lacked ratification by half the state legislatures.
Conclusion
The procedure for amending the Indian Constitution avoids both unyielding rigidity and unbridled central discretion. Through strict procedural checks, federal ratification requirements for key matters, and the overarching judicial doctrine of Basic Structure, the Constitution functions as an adaptable living document rather than a convenient instrument for the Union government.