Introduction
In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Supreme Court observed that Parliament's amending power under Article 368 is inherently limited, and this limitation is itself an unalterable basic feature of the Constitution. Because the Constitution is supreme, Parliament exercises derivative constituent power rather than original constituent power, preventing it from converting its amending authority into absolute or omnipotent power.
Limits on Expanding the Amending Power under Article 368
Parliament cannot unilaterally expand its amending power to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution due to established constitutional doctrines:
- The Donee of Limited Power Principle: In Minerva Mills (1980), the Supreme Court struck down Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368—which had been inserted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976 to exclude judicial review and claim unlimited amending power. The Court ruled that a donee of a limited amending power cannot, by exercising that very power, enlarge it into an absolute power.
- Amending versus Destroying Identity: As established in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), the word 'amend' implies alteration, improvement, or modification within the existing framework; it does not encompass the power to abrogate, repeal, or dismantle the identity and foundational pillars of the Constitution.
- Constitutional Supremacy over Parliamentary Sovereignty: India operates under constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary sovereignty. Any constitutional amendment that damages the core values—such as democracy, rule of law, or secularism—is ultra vires and void ab initio.
Holdings of the Supreme Court in the I.R. Coelho Case (2007)
In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), a unanimous nine-judge constitutional bench resolved the scope of immunity granted to laws placed in the Ninth Schedule under Article 31B:
- No Blanket Immunity Post-1973: The Court ruled that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati verdict) do not enjoy blanket constitutional immunity and are open to judicial review.
- The 'Essence of Rights' Test: If any law included in the Ninth Schedule infringes upon Fundamental Rights that form part of the basic structure—especially the 'golden triangle' of Articles 14, 19, and 21—such a law violates the basic structure and must be invalidated.
- Prevention of a 'Black Hole': The judiciary affirmed that Article 31B cannot serve as a constitutional vault or shield to smuggle in statutes that destroy essential constitutional principles.
Judicial Review as the Linchpin of the Basic Features
Judicial review, recognized under Articles 32, 136, 226, and 227, occupies a primary and paramount position among the basic features of the Indian Constitution:
- Operational Safeguard: While values like federalism, secularism, separation of powers, and the rule of law define constitutional democracy, judicial review is the operational mechanism that protects and enforces them against executive and legislative overreach.
- Checking Majoritarian Excess: Without judicial scrutiny, the basic structure doctrine would remain merely a theoretical concept. Judicial review ensures that electoral majorities cannot dismantle constitutional checks and balances.
- Preserving the Rule of Law: It guarantees the fundamental rights of citizens by ensuring that neither ordinary legislation nor constitutional amendments can extinguish constitutional morality.
Conclusion
The basic structure doctrine, reinforced by judgments in Minerva Mills and I.R. Coelho, establishes that Parliament's amending authority is strictly bound by constitutional limits. Judicial review serves as the ultimate sentinel on the qui vive, without which constitutional supremacy would yield to legislative absolutism.