Introduction
Freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, is the cornerstone of democratic dialogue. However, this right is not absolute and is circumscribed by reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), notably on grounds of public order, decency, or morality, to prevent inter-community friction in a deeply diverse society.
Grounds for Restricting Speech over Religious Sentiments in India
The state balances expressive liberty against social harmony through constitutional provisions, statutory enactments, and judicial doctrines:
- Constitutional Grounds under Article 19(2): Speech can be curbed primarily to maintain 'public order' and 'decency or morality'. The state intervenes when expression threatens to disturb peace or incite violence between religious groups.
- Statutory Framework: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), retained under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), penalizes deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings. Similarly, Section 153A penalizes promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, or place of birth.
- Judicial Thresholds and the Public Order Test: In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. (1957), the Supreme Court upheld Section 295A, clarifying that it does not penalize every insult to religion, but only aggravated forms of deliberate and calculated insults that have a proximate tendency to disrupt public order.
- Advocacy versus Incitement: The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) reiterated that mere advocacy or expression of unpopular views is protected; only expression rising to the level of direct incitement justifies state intervention.
- Illustrative Examples: Legal restrictions and criminal proceedings have been initiated in instances where provocative remarks against religious figures triggered widespread street protests, diplomatic repercussions, or imminent threats of communal violence.
Applicability of the United Kingdom Model to India
The United Kingdom has evolved a distinct legal approach toward speech touching upon religion, shaped by its specific legal and historical trajectory:
- The UK Legal Approach: The UK abolished common-law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in 2008. Protections against religious hatred are governed by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which sets a very high threshold: speech must be explicitly 'threatening' and accompanied by a proven 'intent' to stir up religious hatred. Insulting, abusive, satirical, or offensive remarks alone do not attract criminal sanctions.
- Limitations in the Indian Context: India operates on the principle of 'positive secularism' (S.R. Bommai case), where the state must safeguard equal respect and security for all faiths amid acute demographic diversity. Adopting the permissive UK standard could destabilize communal peace, as offensive speech can serve as a 'spark in a powder keg' (S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram).
- Need for Calibrated Application: While adopting the UK standard wholesale is unviable for India's pluralistic fabric, Indian law must prevent Section 295A from being misused to stifle legitimate academic enquiry, creative expression, or constructive criticism of religious dogma.
Conclusion
While the United Kingdom's liberalized threshold cannot be imported wholesale into India's volatile socio-religious landscape, Indian jurisprudence must maintain strict proportionality. Ensuring that only speech with an imminent threat of public disorder is penalized will uphold both constitutional liberties and communal harmony.