Introduction
In India's Westminster parliamentary model, executive legitimacy derives continuously from legislative accountability. This constitutional principle is anchored in Article 75(3), which mandates the collective responsibility of the Union Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha.
Mechanisms of Parliamentary Control
Parliament exercises constitutional checks on the Union Executive through multiple interconnected mechanisms:
- Deliberative and Procedural Devices: Day-to-day administrative scrutiny is maintained through Question Hour, Zero Hour, Calling Attention motions, and Adjournment motions. The ultimate constitutional sanction resides in the Motion of No-Confidence under Lok Sabha Rule 198, capable of removing a government that has lost legislative confidence.
- Legislative Oversight: Parliament possesses the plenary power to debate, amend, or reject government bills and delegated legislation. In Krishna Kumar Singh (2017), the Supreme Court affirmed parliamentary supremacy, ruling that the executive's ordinance-making power under Article 123 cannot be used to bypass legislative scrutiny.
- Financial Control: Control over public funds operates both ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante control occurs during the budget session through Cut Motions, scrutiny of Demands for Grants, and the passage of the Appropriation Bill (Article 114). Ex-post financial oversight is anchored by financial committees, notably the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which examines reports submitted by the Comptroller and Auditor General under Article 151.
- Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs): The 24 DRSCs provide detailed, cross-party, and in-camera scrutiny of ministry-wise demands for grants, long-term policies, and proposed legislative drafts beyond partisan floor debates.
Measures to Make Parliamentary Oversight More Effective
To address executive aggrandisement and procedural dilution, structural and procedural reforms are necessary:
- Mandate Minimum Annual Sittings: Legislate a mandatory parliamentary calendar ensuring 100 to 120 sitting days annually, as recommended by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), to curb the trend of declining parliamentary sittings.
- Institutionalise Committee Referrals: Make the referral of all substantive and non-urgent legislation to Standing Committees mandatory, arresting the decline seen in the 17th Lok Sabha where only 16% of bills were referred to committees.
- Reform the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law): Restrict the application of party whips strictly to confidence motions and money bills, in line with the Dinesh Goswami Committee recommendations, restoring the autonomy of legislators to debate and critique executive policies freely.
- Institutionalise Opposition Days: Introduce dedicated 'Opposition Days' on the lines of the British House of Commons, allowing non-treasury benches to determine the legislative and debate agenda.
- Curb the Guillotine Mechanism: Reform budget procedures to ensure that substantial portions of departmental Demands for Grants are not passed en masse without floor debate and detailed examination.
Conclusion
Transitioning from ritualistic floor scrutiny to continuous, empowered institutional oversight is imperative. Strengthening parliamentary committees and procedural guarantees will safeguard constitutional checks and balances and prevent executive dominance.