Introduction
While India adopted the British Westminster model characterised by the fusion of executive and legislative powers as described by Walter Bagehot, the framers deliberately modified its institutional architecture. The resulting constitutional design departs significantly from British conventions to accommodate India's republican character, pluralism, and federal structure.
Core Institutional Convergences
Both India and Britain share the foundational tenets of the Westminster parliamentary model:
- Executive-Legislative Fusion: The executive is drawn directly from the legislature and remains continuously accountable to it.
- Collective Responsibility: The Council of Ministers functions as a collective body that survives only as long as it enjoys the confidence of the lower house (the House of Commons in the UK and the Lok Sabha in India).
- Dual Executive: Both systems maintain a clear distinction between the de jure ceremonial head of state and the de facto political head of government (the Prime Minister).
Key Divergences between Indian and British Systems
Despite structural similarities, the Indian parliamentary framework deviates from British constitutional practice in several crucial respects:
- Parliamentary Sovereignty vs. Constitutional Supremacy: Under A.V. Dicey's classical doctrine, the British Parliament exercises legal sovereignty with untrammelled legislative authority. In contrast, the Indian Parliament functions under constitutional supremacy, restricted by a codified constitution, judicial review under Article 13, and the Basic Structure doctrine enunciated in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
- Hereditary Monarchy vs. Republicanism: Britain retains a hereditary Crown as its head of state. India established a democratic republic with an indirectly elected President under Article 54, reflecting popular sovereignty.
- Executive Eligibility and Composition: By strict convention, the British Prime Minister must be a member of the House of Commons. In India, the Prime Minister and ministers may belong to either the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. Furthermore, Article 75(5) permits an individual to serve as a minister for up to six months without holding parliamentary membership.
- Legal Responsibility of Ministers: British ministers bear individual legal liability for official acts through the convention of royal countersignature. In India, ministers bear no direct legal liability for executive acts, and Article 74(2) bars courts from inquiring into advice tendered by ministers to the President.
- Institutionalised Opposition: Britain recognises the formal institution of the 'Shadow Cabinet', financed by the state to provide alternate policy readiness and scrutinise government portfolios. India does not maintain an institutionalised Shadow Cabinet mechanism.
- Unitary Omnipotence vs. Federal Limitation: Westminster possesses unitary legislative omnipotence. Conversely, Indian parliamentary authority is circumscribed by the federal distribution of powers under the Seventh Schedule.
Conclusion
India successfully indigenised the Westminster model by substituting Diceyan parliamentary absolutism with constitutional supremacy and republican constitutional morality. This synthesis preserves executive accountability while safeguarding fundamental rights and federal diversity.