Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
G.E. Moore, a pivotal figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, sought to combat philosophical skepticism through his “Defence of Common Sense” (1925). He argued for the certainty of certain common-sense beliefs – such as the existence of external objects and other minds – not through elaborate metaphysical arguments, but by demonstrating their self-evident truth. The claim that Moore’s defence is essentially a defence of ordinary language suggests that his method relies heavily on the meanings and uses of words as they are understood in everyday discourse. While not explicitly a linguistic philosopher, Moore’s emphasis on clarity and the direct appeal to how we actually *use* language provides a crucial foundation for later developments in ordinary language philosophy.
Moore’s Defence of Common Sense: A Methodological Overview
Moore’s approach in “Defence of Common Sense” was remarkably straightforward. He began by listing six propositions that he claimed no one rationally doubts – for example, “that the world has existed for a long time past” and “that other human beings are conscious.” He then proceeded to *prove* these propositions, not by offering new evidence, but by demonstrating that any attempt to deny them leads to absurdities. This proof, he argued, consisted in showing that the denial of these propositions is incompatible with the very meaning of the terms involved.
The Connection to Ordinary Language Philosophy
The link between Moore’s method and ordinary language philosophy is significant. Philosophers like J.L. Austin and the Oxford school (including Gilbert Ryle and P.F. Strawson) later argued that many philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of language. They believed that careful attention to how words are actually used in everyday contexts could dissolve these problems. Moore, while not explicitly focused on linguistic analysis, implicitly acknowledged the importance of ordinary language by appealing to the intuitive understanding of terms like “existence,” “consciousness,” and “past.”
Similarities
- Emphasis on Clarity: Both Moore and ordinary language philosophers prioritized clarity and precision in philosophical discourse. Moore sought to clarify the meaning of common-sense propositions, while the latter group aimed to clarify the meaning of everyday language.
- Rejection of Abstract Speculation: Both rejected highly abstract and speculative metaphysical systems. Moore grounded his arguments in concrete, observable facts and common-sense beliefs, while ordinary language philosophers focused on the concrete uses of language.
- Focus on ‘What We Say’: Moore’s appeal to what ‘we know’ implicitly relies on the shared linguistic framework that allows for such knowledge to be communicated and understood.
Points of Divergence
However, it’s inaccurate to equate Moore’s defence entirely with a defence of ordinary language. Several key differences exist:
Differences
- Moore’s Focus on Certainty: Moore aimed to establish the *certainty* of common-sense beliefs. Ordinary language philosophers, while interested in meaning, were less concerned with establishing absolute certainty.
- Lack of Systematic Linguistic Analysis: Moore did not engage in the detailed, systematic analysis of language that characterized ordinary language philosophy. He took the meanings of words as given, rather than investigating them rigorously.
- Epistemological vs. Linguistic Focus: Moore’s primary concern was epistemological – justifying knowledge. Ordinary language philosophy, while having epistemological implications, was primarily concerned with the nature of meaning and use.
Illustrative Example: The Proposition “There have been hands”
Moore famously defended the proposition “There have been hands.” He argued that anyone who denies this proposition must either be mistaken about the meaning of “hands” or be deliberately trying to mislead. This argument relies on the ordinary understanding of what constitutes “hands” and the historical existence of such things. While Moore doesn’t dissect the linguistic nuances of “hands,” his argument implicitly relies on the shared linguistic understanding of the term. However, an ordinary language philosopher might go further, examining the various ways “hands” is used in different contexts to reveal potential sources of confusion.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while Moore’s “Defence of Common Sense” is not *explicitly* a defence of ordinary language, it lays crucial groundwork for the development of ordinary language philosophy. His emphasis on clarity, rejection of abstract speculation, and implicit reliance on the meanings of words in everyday discourse anticipate many of the central tenets of this later movement. However, Moore’s primary goal was epistemological certainty, and he lacked the systematic linguistic analysis that characterized the work of Austin, Ryle, and Strawson. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that Moore’s defence *prefigures* a defence of ordinary language, rather than being entirely equivalent to it.
Answer Length
This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.