Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
The concept of a ‘person’ has been central to philosophical inquiry, particularly within metaphysics and ethics. Traditionally, the person was understood as a subject of experience possessing a unified consciousness, rational agency, and moral responsibility. However, P.F. Strawson, in his influential essay “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), challenged this traditional view, arguing that our understanding of persons is fundamentally rooted in our practical, interpersonal engagements rather than abstract metaphysical considerations. He proposes a relational account of persons, emphasizing the importance of ‘reactive attitudes’ in shaping our understanding of agency and responsibility. This essay will explain and evaluate Strawson’s arguments for his conception of the nature of a person.
The Traditional View and Strawson’s Challenge
Strawson’s argument arises as a response to the problem of free will and determinism. The traditional view, often associated with libertarianism, posits that genuine moral responsibility requires individuals to have ‘ultimate control’ over their actions – a capacity for choices unconstrained by causal factors. However, if determinism is true (every event is causally necessitated), this notion of ultimate control seems impossible. Strawson doesn’t directly address whether determinism is true; instead, he shifts the focus from metaphysical freedom to our *practices* of holding people responsible.
Strawson’s Basic and Reactive Attitudes
Strawson distinguishes between two fundamental stances we adopt towards others: the ‘basic attitudes’ and the ‘reactive attitudes’. Basic attitudes are objective, detached, and typically adopted when we view others as objects of causal explanation – like a scientist observing a phenomenon. We might explain someone’s behavior in terms of their brain chemistry or upbringing. However, our everyday interactions are more often governed by reactive attitudes. These are feelings like gratitude, resentment, indignation, love, and affection, which are naturally expressed in interpersonal relationships.
These reactive attitudes are not simply responses to actions; they are *constitutive* of our understanding of agency. We hold people responsible precisely because we are capable of these feelings. For example, we feel resentment towards someone who intentionally harms us, not because they *could have done otherwise* in a metaphysical sense, but because their action violates our expectations of reciprocal regard.
The Implications for the Concept of a Person
Strawson argues that the concept of a person is inextricably linked to our capacity for reactive attitudes. To regard someone as a person is to be prepared to engage with them in terms of these attitudes. This doesn’t require believing in libertarian free will. Even if determinism is true, we will likely continue to hold people responsible because our reactive attitudes are deeply ingrained in our social practices and emotional lives. He suggests that only in extremely unusual circumstances – such as discovering that someone is a sophisticated robot or a victim of complete brainwashing – would we cease to hold them morally responsible.
Evaluating Strawson’s Arguments
Strawson’s account offers a compelling alternative to traditional metaphysical debates about free will. Its strength lies in its grounding in everyday experience and its recognition of the social and emotional dimensions of moral responsibility. However, it’s not without its critics.
- The Problem of Moral Progress: Some argue that Strawson’s account struggles to explain moral progress. If reactive attitudes are simply ingrained responses, how can we justify challenging existing norms and striving for a more just society?
- The Role of Reason: Critics contend that Strawson downplays the role of reason in moral judgment. While reactive attitudes are important, they can also be biased and irrational.
- The Scope of Reactive Attitudes: The applicability of reactive attitudes to all persons is questionable. Individuals with severe mental disabilities, for example, may not be capable of engaging in the reciprocal relationships that ground these attitudes.
Despite these criticisms, Strawson’s work remains highly influential, prompting a shift in philosophical discussions about free will and responsibility towards a more pragmatic and relational approach.
Conclusion
Strawson’s conception of the person, rooted in our practical engagements and reactive attitudes, provides a powerful critique of traditional metaphysical approaches to freedom and responsibility. While not without its limitations, his work highlights the importance of understanding agency not as an abstract property but as a socially constructed phenomenon. His emphasis on the interpersonal context of moral judgment continues to shape contemporary debates in philosophy, ethics, and law, urging us to consider the practical implications of our beliefs about human agency and accountability.
Answer Length
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