Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
The distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ – descriptive statements about what *is* the case and normative statements about what *ought* to be the case – forms a cornerstone of ethical and philosophical debate. This dichotomy, famously articulated by David Hume in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-1740), questions the logical possibility of deriving moral obligations or values from factual observations. Hume argued that simply because something *is* a certain way does not mean it *ought* to be that way. This ‘is-ought’ problem continues to be a central concern in metaethics, influencing discussions on moral reasoning, political philosophy, and the foundations of law. The question asks us to critically assess the validity of this separation.
Justifications for the Dichotomy
Hume’s argument rests on the observation that logic alone cannot bridge the gap between descriptive and prescriptive statements. He believed that reason can only demonstrate relations of ideas (mathematical truths) or matters of fact (empirical observations), but cannot dictate what *should* be.
- Logical Positivism: This 20th-century philosophical movement reinforced the ‘is-ought’ gap by advocating for the verification principle – a statement is meaningful only if it can be empirically verified. Moral statements, being non-verifiable, were deemed cognitively meaningless.
- Moral Anti-Realism: This view denies the existence of objective moral facts. If there are no objective moral truths, then ‘ought’ statements cannot be grounded in ‘is’ statements describing a reality that includes those truths. Emotivism, a form of moral anti-realism, suggests ‘ought’ statements are merely expressions of emotion.
- G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument: Moore argued that for any definition of ‘good’ offered in terms of natural properties (e.g., pleasure), it always remains an open question whether that property *is* actually good. This suggests ‘good’ is a non-natural property, irreducible to factual descriptions.
Rejections of the Dichotomy & Attempts at Bridging the Gap
Despite its enduring influence, the ‘is-ought’ dichotomy has faced significant challenges. Several philosophical positions attempt to demonstrate how ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘is’.
- Moral Realism: This position asserts that moral facts *do* exist, independent of human opinion. If moral facts are part of reality, then ‘ought’ statements can be grounded in ‘is’ statements describing that reality. However, establishing the existence and accessibility of these moral facts remains a challenge.
- Practical Reason (Kant): Immanuel Kant argued that reason *does* have a normative dimension. The Categorical Imperative, derived from the structure of rational agency itself, provides a basis for moral obligation. While starting from a rational ‘is’ (the nature of reason), it leads to a normative ‘ought’ (moral duty).
- Value Judgments & Implicit Norms: Critics argue that all observations are theory-laden and involve implicit value judgments. When we describe something as a ‘problem’ or a ‘disease’, we are already implicitly expressing a negative evaluation – an ‘ought’ statement.
- Evolutionary Ethics: Some argue that moral sentiments and norms have evolved through natural selection because they promote social cooperation and survival. Thus, ‘ought’ statements can be grounded in the ‘is’ of our evolutionary history.
The Role of ‘Ought’ in Descriptive Statements
Furthermore, the strict separation can be challenged by recognizing that descriptive statements often *imply* normative considerations. For example, describing a situation as ‘unfair’ already incorporates a value judgment about how things *should* be. The very act of identifying a problem implies a desire for a solution, a normative ‘ought’.
| Perspective | View on ‘Is-Ought’ Dichotomy | Key Argument |
|---|---|---|
| Hume | Strongly upholds | Deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ commits the naturalistic fallacy. |
| Moral Realist | Rejects | Moral facts exist and can ground ‘ought’ statements. |
| Kant | Attempts to bridge | Practical reason provides a basis for deriving moral obligations. |
Conclusion
The dichotomy between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ remains a complex and contested issue in philosophy. While Hume’s initial argument highlights the logical difficulties in deriving normative statements from descriptive ones, various philosophical positions offer compelling counterarguments. The debate reveals the intricate relationship between facts, values, and human reasoning. Ultimately, a complete rejection of the dichotomy may be too simplistic, but a rigid adherence to it risks overlooking the inherent normative dimensions embedded within our understanding of the world and the role of reason in shaping our moral obligations.
Answer Length
This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.