Critically analyze India's nuclear policy.

Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy

India’s nuclear journey can be divided into three phases:

• Phase 1 (1947-1974): Initial focus on developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, driven by Homi Bhabha. This phase culminated in the 1974 Pokhran-I test, framed as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE).
• Phase 2 (1974-1998): A period of ambiguity and restraint, responding to international pressure and sanctions following Pokhran-I. India continued developing its nuclear capabilities, but maintained a policy of non-proliferation.
• Phase 3 (1998-Present): Marked by the Pokhran-II tests in 1998, declaring India a nuclear weapon state. This led to the formulation of a nuclear doctrine in 2003, outlining NFU and CMD.

Core Tenets of India’s Nuclear Policy

No First Use (NFU)

Declared in 2003, NFU signifies India’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked with nuclear or biological weapons. This is a cornerstone of India’s responsible nuclear posture, aiming to reduce escalation risks. However, the NFU pledge has been questioned due to concerns about Pakistan’s first-use strategy and the development of tactical nuclear weapons.

Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)

CMD aims to develop and maintain a nuclear force sufficient to deter potential adversaries from initiating a nuclear attack. The definition of ‘minimum’ is dynamic and depends on the perceived threat level. It involves a triad of land-based missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-based ballistic missiles, enhancing survivability and ensuring retaliatory capability.

Challenges to India’s Nuclear Policy

• Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons and a first-use doctrine pose a significant challenge to India’s NFU policy.
• China’s Nuclear Modernization: China’s rapid nuclear modernization, including the development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), raises concerns about India’s deterrent capabilities.
• Nuclear Security: Ensuring the physical security of nuclear materials and facilities remains a critical challenge.
• Command and Control: Maintaining a robust and secure command and control system is essential to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
• International Pressure: Continued pressure from the international community to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and further limit India’s nuclear program.

Recent Developments and Future Prospects

Recent statements by Indian officials have hinted at a possible review of the NFU policy, suggesting a more flexible approach. This is driven by the evolving security landscape and the need to maintain a credible deterrent. India is also focusing on strengthening its nuclear triad and enhancing its missile capabilities. The development of the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) demonstrates India’s growing strategic reach. Furthermore, India’s participation in multilateral export control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reflects its commitment to responsible nuclear behavior.

Policy Element	Original Stance (2003)	Current Debate/Evolution
No First Use	Unconditional commitment	Potential for conditional NFU or ‘first use massive retaliation’
Credible Minimum Deterrence	Focus on survivability and retaliatory capability	Emphasis on triad development and enhanced missile capabilities
Nuclear Security	Emphasis on physical protection and accounting	Strengthened international cooperation and adoption of best practices