Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
George Berkeley, an 18th-century Irish philosopher, is renowned for his subjective idealism, famously summarized by the phrase "esse est percipi" – to be is to be perceived. This radical claim asserts that material objects exist only as perceptions in the minds of perceivers, and that there is no independently existing material substance. This position directly challenges common-sense realism. The question asks us to explore how Berkeley establishes this view, and then to contrast the responses of two prominent 20th-century philosophers, G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, to Berkeley’s idealism, paying particular attention to the nuances of their differing reactions.
Berkeley’s Establishment of Idealism
Berkeley’s argument for idealism rests on several key premises. Firstly, he argues that we only ever experience our perceptions – qualities like color, shape, and texture – and never the underlying substance that supposedly possesses these qualities. He challenges us to imagine what it would be like to conceive of an object without any qualities. The answer, he claims, is impossible. Secondly, he contends that the concept of ‘matter’ as an unthinking, unperceiving substance is incoherent. If something is not perceived by a mind, Berkeley argues, it cannot exist.
Berkeley doesn’t deny the existence of external objects; rather, he redefines their existence. Objects exist because they are perpetually perceived by God. This divine perception ensures the continuity and regularity of experience. Without God’s constant perception, the world would flicker in and out of existence with our individual perceptions. This theological component is crucial to Berkeley’s system, preventing it from collapsing into solipsism (the belief that only one’s own mind is sure to exist).
Moore’s Reaction to Berkeley
G.E. Moore, a staunch defender of common sense, reacted to Berkeley’s idealism with direct opposition. In his famous paper "The Refutation of Idealism" (1903), Moore doesn’t attempt to disprove Berkeley’s arguments logically. Instead, he argues that Berkeley’s conclusion – that material objects do not exist independently of perception – is simply absurd and contradicts our everyday experience. Moore asserts that we all *know* that external objects exist, and this knowledge is more certain than any philosophical argument to the contrary.
Moore’s approach is fundamentally pragmatic. He focuses on the immediate data of experience and the undeniable fact that we perceive an external world. He doesn’t engage with the intricacies of Berkeley’s arguments about perception and substance; he simply declares that the denial of the external world is demonstrably false. He uses the ‘here is one hand, and here is another’ example to demonstrate the certainty of external world perception.
Russell’s Reaction to Berkeley
Bertrand Russell, a logical atomist, offered a more nuanced critique of Berkeley. While also rejecting idealism, Russell’s rejection stemmed from a different source than Moore’s. Russell acknowledged the logical difficulties inherent in Berkeley’s position, particularly the problem of other minds. If existence is dependent on perception, how can we be sure that other minds exist?
Russell’s critique centers on the concept of ‘sense-data’. He argued that our immediate experience consists of sense-data (e.g., color patches, sounds), and these sense-data are not necessarily dependent on a perceiving mind. He proposed a neutral monism, suggesting that both mind and matter are constructed from a more fundamental substance – sense-data. Russell attempted to provide a logical foundation for realism by analyzing the structure of our experience and identifying the objective elements within it. He believed that constructing a logically coherent account of the external world was possible, unlike Berkeley’s reliance on divine intervention.
Differences Between Moore and Russell’s Reactions
The key difference between Moore and Russell’s reactions lies in their methodologies. Moore’s response is primarily intuitive and based on common sense. He rejects idealism because it clashes with our immediate experience and intuitive beliefs. He doesn’t offer a detailed philosophical argument; he simply asserts the obviousness of the external world.
Russell, on the other hand, offers a sophisticated logical and epistemological critique. He attempts to reconstruct our knowledge of the external world from the ground up, analyzing the structure of experience and identifying the objective elements within it. While both reject idealism, Moore does so on the basis of what he *knows* to be true, while Russell attempts to *show* why idealism is false through logical analysis. Moore’s approach is descriptive, while Russell’s is reconstructive.
| Feature | G.E. Moore | Bertrand Russell |
|---|---|---|
| Methodology | Intuitive, Common Sense | Logical Analysis, Epistemology |
| Basis of Rejection | Contradiction of Immediate Experience | Logical Incoherence, Problem of Other Minds |
| Approach | Descriptive | Reconstructive |
| Focus | Certainty of External World | Structure of Experience, Sense-Data |
Conclusion
In conclusion, Berkeley’s idealism, built upon the principle of ‘esse est percipi’, presents a radical challenge to our understanding of reality. While both Moore and Russell rejected Berkeley’s view, their approaches differed significantly. Moore relied on the self-evident truth of the external world, while Russell sought a logical foundation for realism through the analysis of sense-data. The contrast between their reactions highlights the enduring tension between common-sense intuition and rigorous philosophical analysis in addressing fundamental questions about existence and knowledge.
Answer Length
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