How does Wittgenstein apply the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing' to point to a single way of apprehending the most decisive problems of philosophy? Is he justified? Give reasons for your answer.

The ‘Saying’ and ‘Showing’ Distinction

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that language functions primarily as a picture of reality. Propositions (what can be ‘said’) are meaningful only if they depict possible states of affairs. They possess a logical form that mirrors the logical form of the world. However, there are things that are essential to understanding language and the world, but which cannot be captured in propositions. These are things that ‘show’ themselves.

‘Saying’ refers to the propositional content of language – the factual claims we make. It’s governed by rules of logic and syntax. ‘Showing’, on the other hand, encompasses the logical form itself, ethical and aesthetic values, and the mystical. These aspects are not representable *in* language; they are manifested *through* language and the world. For example, the logical form of a proposition (that it *is* a proposition) cannot be stated; it is shown by the proposition’s structure.

Applying the Distinction to Philosophical Problems

Wittgenstein believed that many traditional philosophical problems arise from a misunderstanding of the limits of language. Philosophers attempt to *say* things that can only be *shown*. This leads to nonsensical propositions that appear profound but are ultimately meaningless. He argues that problems in ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics are not problems to be solved, but rather illusions created by attempting to express the inexpressible.

Consider ethics. Wittgenstein argues that ethical values are not facts about the world that can be stated. We cannot *say* what is good or bad in a factual sense. Instead, ethical values *show* themselves in our actions, our attitudes, and the way we live our lives. Attempting to formulate ethical principles as propositions leads to confusion and ultimately, to the illusion of ethical disagreement. Similarly, the mystical – that which lies beyond the limits of our conceptual understanding – can only be *shown* through silence, not *said* through language.

He extends this to the philosophy of language itself. The attempt to define meaning, for instance, is seen as a misguided effort to *say* what can only be *shown* in the use of language. Meaning isn’t a property inherent in words but arises from their use in specific contexts – a point he develops more fully in his later work.

Justification and Critique

Wittgenstein’s approach is justified to a considerable extent. His critique of traditional metaphysics exposes the often-unacknowledged assumptions underlying philosophical arguments. By highlighting the limitations of language, he forces us to reconsider the nature of philosophical inquiry. His emphasis on the use of language, rather than its logical structure, paved the way for ordinary language philosophy and a more pragmatic approach to philosophical problems.

However, the distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’ is not without its critics. Some argue that it is itself a metaphysical claim, ironically violating its own principle of silence regarding the inexpressible. Furthermore, the notion of ‘showing’ can be vague and difficult to grasp. What exactly constitutes ‘showing’ and how can we distinguish it from mere suggestion or implication? Critics like Hilary Putnam have argued that Wittgenstein’s later work, while insightful, doesn’t fully resolve the problems he identifies in the *Tractatus*.

Moreover, the claim that ethical and aesthetic values are simply ‘shown’ and cannot be meaningfully discussed seems to some to be overly restrictive. While acknowledging the limitations of language, it’s possible to argue that reasoned ethical debate and aesthetic criticism are valuable and contribute to our understanding of these domains, even if they don’t yield definitive answers.