Are the Cārvākas consistent when they hold that inference is not a source of knowledge? Discuss.

Cārvāka Epistemology: Pratyakṣa as the Sole Pramāṇa

The Cārvākas maintain a strict empiricism. They believe that knowledge is limited to what can be directly perceived through the senses. Anything beyond this – the existence of an afterlife, the efficacy of Vedic rituals, the existence of a soul – is considered speculative and unverifiable. This emphasis on direct perception stems from their materialistic ontology, which posits that only material substances exist. Consequently, knowledge about the material world is attainable through sensory experience, while anything beyond the material realm is deemed meaningless.

The Rejection of Inference (Anumāṇa)

Cārvākas reject inference primarily due to their skepticism about the validity of universal propositions (vyāpti). Inference relies on establishing a relationship between a particular instance and a general rule. For example, inferring fire from smoke requires the understanding that ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. Cārvākas argue that such universal connections cannot be definitively established through perception. Every observation is limited to a specific instance, and generalizing from that instance to a universal rule is considered an unwarranted leap of logic. They view the ‘three terms’ (hetu, sādhan, and pratyaya) involved in inference as illusory and lacking empirical grounding.

The Apparent Contradiction: Practical Reasoning (Vyāpāra)

A significant challenge to the Cārvāka position arises from their engagement in practical reasoning (vyāpāra) in everyday life. They engage in debates, offer arguments, and make predictions about future events – all of which seem to rely on inferential processes. For instance, a Cārvāka might avoid a dangerous animal based on past experiences, seemingly inferring that the animal poses a threat. This apparent contradiction has led to various interpretations.

Reconciling the Position: Different Interpretations

• Pragmatic Inference: Some scholars argue that the Cārvākas accept a limited form of inference that is purely pragmatic. This ‘inference’ isn’t considered a source of *certain* knowledge but a practical tool for navigating the world. It’s based on observed regularities, not on established universal truths.
• Distinction between Knowledge and Action: Another interpretation suggests that the Cārvākas distinguish between knowledge (jñāna) and action (karma). Inference might be useful for guiding action, but it doesn’t qualify as genuine knowledge.
• Rejection of Formal Logic: The Cārvākas may have rejected the *formal* structure of inference as presented by other schools, while still acknowledging the role of experience in forming expectations and guiding behavior.

Critique of the Cārvāka Stance

Despite attempts at reconciliation, the Cārvāka position remains vulnerable to criticism. The complete rejection of inference seems overly restrictive and fails to account for the predictive power of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, their reliance on direct perception alone can be problematic, as perception is often subjective and prone to error. The denial of causality, a consequence of rejecting inference, also presents difficulties in explaining the regularities observed in the natural world.