Show how Wittgenstein's critique of solipsism culminates in the critique of private language.

Wittgenstein’s Early Views: The *Tractatus* and Solipsism

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein proposed that meaningful propositions must picture facts in the world. This ‘picture theory’ implied that language gains meaning through its correspondence to reality. However, this framework struggled to account for subjective experiences, ethical statements, and ultimately, the existence of other minds. The logical conclusion, if one strictly adhered to this view, was the possibility of solipsism. If language only meaningfully represents facts, and facts are accessible only to the individual, then the existence of an external world, and other minds within it, becomes logically unverifiable. The ‘I’ in the *Tractatus* is not a metaphysical subject but a limiting condition of the world, a point from which all facts are viewed, but this doesn’t resolve the solipsistic worry.

The Turn: From Picture Theory to Language-Games

Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), marked a radical departure from the *Tractatus*. He rejected the picture theory, arguing that meaning isn’t derived from a correspondence to reality, but from the *use* of language within specific ‘language-games’. A language-game is a context-dependent activity where language is interwoven with actions and forms of life. This shift was prompted by his realization that language is not a monolithic entity with a single, underlying logical structure, but a diverse collection of practices. He observed that the meaning of a word isn’t a fixed entity, but is determined by how it is used in a particular context. This move away from a purely representational view of language was crucial in dismantling the foundations of his earlier solipsistic leanings.

The Critique of Solipsism: The Role of Forms of Life

Wittgenstein argued that solipsism arises from a misunderstanding of the nature of language and thought. He introduced the concept of ‘forms of life’ – the shared practices, customs, and institutions that constitute our social world. These forms of life are not merely external frameworks, but are constitutive of our very understanding of the world. We learn language within these forms of life, and our concepts are inextricably linked to them. Solipsism, therefore, is not a logical possibility, but a conceptual confusion. To even *conceive* of oneself as the sole existing mind requires a shared language and a set of rules for thought, which are themselves products of social interaction. The very idea of a ‘private world’ is incoherent because it presupposes the existence of a public language to articulate it.

The Argument Against Private Language

The culmination of Wittgenstein’s critique is his famous argument against the possibility of a private language. He asks us to imagine someone who invents a language that only they can understand, using signs and naming sensations privately. He argues that such a language would be impossible because there would be no way to ensure the correct application of the signs. Without public criteria for correctness, the individual could not distinguish between genuinely applying a sign to a sensation and merely *thinking* they are.

Consider this example: Imagine someone consistently writing ‘pain’ whenever they feel a pain sensation. But how could they be sure they are applying the sign ‘pain’ correctly? There’s no external standard, no public agreement, to verify the connection between the sign and the sensation. The individual could be mistaken, and there would be no way to know. This lack of public criteria undermines the very possibility of meaning. A language, Wittgenstein argues, is fundamentally a social phenomenon, requiring shared rules and practices for its operation.

The argument against private language directly addresses the solipsistic concern. If a language requires public criteria for meaning, then the idea of a mind existing in complete isolation, with a language accessible only to itself, is logically impossible. The very possibility of thought and language depends on our participation in a shared, public world.