Establish the tenability of later Wittgenstein's motion of language as form of life.

The Shift from the *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations*

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, as articulated in the *Tractatus*, aimed to delineate the logical limits of language. He believed that meaningful propositions could only depict facts, and that philosophical problems arose from attempts to speak meaningfully about things beyond these limits. This led to a focus on logical form and a dismissal of metaphysics as nonsensical. However, Wittgenstein became increasingly dissatisfied with this approach, recognizing its inability to account for the richness and complexity of everyday language use.

Language-Games and Meaning as Use

The core of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy lies in the concept of “language-games.” He argued that the meaning of a word isn’t a fixed entity but is determined by its role in a particular language-game. A language-game is a specific context of language use, governed by rules and conventions. Examples include giving orders, describing objects, telling jokes, or praying. These games aren’t arbitrary; they are interwoven with our actions and practices.

Wittgenstein famously stated, “meaning is use.” This doesn’t imply that anything goes, but rather that understanding the meaning of a word requires understanding how it is used within a specific language-game. The meaning isn’t something *in* the word itself, but something *derived from* its application.

Language as a Form of Life

The notion of “form of life” extends the idea of language-games. A form of life encompasses the entire context of human activity – our customs, institutions, beliefs, and ways of interacting with the world – within which language-games are embedded. Language isn’t simply a tool we use to describe a pre-existing reality; it is constitutive of our reality. It shapes how we perceive, think, and act.

Consider, for example, the game of building. The meaning of words like “pillar,” “slab,” “beam” are understood not through abstract definitions, but through their role in the practical activity of building. This activity, along with the associated tools, techniques, and social organization, constitutes a form of life. Language is integral to this form of life, not merely a reflection of it.

Tenability and Addressing Objections

The tenability of Wittgenstein’s claim rests on its ability to dissolve philosophical problems that arise from a representational view of language. Traditional philosophical problems, such as the problem of other minds or the nature of consciousness, often stem from the assumption that language must accurately represent reality. Wittgenstein argues that these problems are pseudo-problems, arising from misunderstandings about how language functions.

However, the concept of “form of life” isn’t without its critics. Some argue that it is vague and lacks explanatory power. What exactly constitutes a “form of life”? Is it simply culture? Wittgenstein’s response would likely be that attempting to provide a precise definition misses the point. The concept is meant to be descriptive, not prescriptive. It highlights the embeddedness of language in human practices, rather than offering a rigid categorization.

Another objection concerns relativism. If meaning is determined by a form of life, does this imply that there are no objective truths? Wittgenstein doesn’t necessarily deny the existence of objective facts, but he argues that our access to these facts is always mediated by language and our forms of life. This doesn’t mean that all beliefs are equally valid, but that our understanding of truth is always situated.

Furthermore, the idea that language *constitutes* reality, rather than merely describing it, can be seen as overly strong. Critics might argue that there is a reality independent of our linguistic frameworks. Wittgenstein’s response would likely be that we cannot meaningfully speak about a reality *outside* of all possible forms of life. Our concepts and categories are always shaped by our practices.