How do Naiyāyikas respond to Cārvāka's objections against inference (anumāna) and establish inference as an independent means of knowledge? Critically discuss.

Cārvāka’s Critique of Inference

Cārvākas, adhering to a radical empiricism, maintain that all knowledge originates from direct perception. They argue that inference is ultimately based on the observation of concomitance, which itself is a perceptual judgment. Therefore, inference doesn’t provide *new* knowledge but merely recalls previously perceived connections. Their primary objections can be summarized as follows:

• The Problem of the Infinite Regress: If inference requires a prior justification, and that justification requires another inference, it leads to an infinite regress, rendering the process ultimately ungrounded.
• The Fallibility of Inference: Inferences can be wrong. Since Cārvākas only accept certain knowledge, and inference is prone to error, it cannot be a source of valid knowledge.
• Lack of Invariable Concomitance: Cārvākas question the existence of truly invariable concomitance (vyāpti). They argue that observed correlations are always based on limited experience and cannot guarantee universal validity.

Naiyāyika Response: Establishing Inference as a Pramāṇa

The Naiyāyikas, in contrast, consider inference (anumāna) a distinct and independent pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge). Their defense rests on a detailed analysis of the structure of inference and the concept of vyāpti.

Vyāpti: The Core of Naiyāyika Inference

The Naiyāyikas define vyāpti as the invariable concomitance between the hetu (middle term) and the sādhya (major term). It’s not merely observed correlation but a necessary connection. They distinguish between:

• Co-presence (sahacāratva): Simply observing that two things occur together. This is insufficient for vyāpti.
• Invariable Concomitance (vyāpti): The necessary connection where the presence of the hetu *guarantees* the presence of the sādhya, and the absence of the hetu *guarantees* the absence of the sādhya.

Establishing vyāpti requires rigorous testing through methods like:

• Positive Instances: Observing the concomitance in numerous positive cases.
• Negative Instances: Searching for counter-examples where the hetu is present but the sādhya is absent.

Types of Anumāṇa

Naiyāyikas identify three main types of inference:

Type of Anumāṇa	Description	Example
Pūrvavat (Prior Inference)	Inference based on observing the effect and inferring the cause.	Seeing smoke and inferring fire.
Sheṣavat (Posterior Inference)	Inference based on observing the cause and inferring the effect.	Seeing clouds and inferring rain.
Chinnā (Indirect Inference)	Inference based on the absence of one thing inferring the absence of another.	The pot is not broken (absence of cracks) therefore it holds water.

Addressing Cārvāka Objections

The Naiyāyikas respond to Cārvāka’s objections as follows:

• Infinite Regress: They argue that the regress is not vicious. The justification for inference doesn’t require an infinite chain of inferences, but rests on the self-evident validity of perception and the logical structure of inference itself.
• Fallibility: They acknowledge that inferences *can* be wrong, but this doesn’t invalidate inference as a whole. Errors arise from faulty observation or incorrect application of logical principles, not from the inherent flaw in the process of inference.
• Lack of Vyāpti: They maintain that vyāpti *can* be established through rigorous empirical testing and logical analysis. The absence of observed counter-examples strengthens the claim of invariable concomitance.