Describe the composition of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Discuss its voluntary jurisdiction.

Composition of the International Court of Justice

The ICJ is composed of 15 judges, elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council from a list of candidates nominated by national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, based at The Hague. Article 31 of the ICJ Statute outlines the election process.

• Qualifications: Judges must be persons of high moral character and possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest national judicial offices or be jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law (Article 2 of the ICJ Statute).
• Election Process: The General Assembly and Security Council vote independently. A candidate must receive an absolute majority in both bodies to be elected. If there is a disagreement, a Joint Consultative Committee (comprising representatives from the General Assembly and Security Council) is convened to propose a compromise list.
• Term of Office: Judges are elected for nine-year terms and are eligible for re-election. The terms of five judges are renewed every three years.
• Structure: The Court elects a President and Vice-President for three-year terms.
• Ad Hoc Judges: A state party to a case may choose to appoint an ad hoc judge if there is no judge of its nationality on the bench. This ensures representation and expertise relevant to the specific case.

Voluntary Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

The ICJ operates on the principle of consent. Unlike national courts, it does not have compulsory jurisdiction over states. States must voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction in order for the Court to hear a case. This voluntary jurisdiction manifests in several ways:

• Special Agreement (Compromis): This is the most common method. Two or more states agree to submit a specific dispute to the ICJ through a treaty called a ‘compromis’.
• Compromissory Clause: Many treaties contain a ‘compromissory clause’ stipulating that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty shall be submitted to the ICJ.
• Optional Clause Declarations (Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute): States can make a unilateral declaration recognizing the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. These declarations can be conditional, limiting the scope of jurisdiction (e.g., excluding disputes relating to national security).
• Forum Prorogatum: A state may implicitly consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction by appearing before the Court without objecting to its jurisdiction.

Limitations to Voluntary Jurisdiction

Despite these avenues for consent, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is subject to several limitations:

• Reservations to Optional Clause Declarations: States frequently attach reservations to their Optional Clause declarations, limiting the scope of their acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. These reservations can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the system.
• Reciprocity: Jurisdiction based on the Optional Clause is reciprocal – a state can only be brought before the Court by another state that has also accepted compulsory jurisdiction.
• Temporal Limitations: Consent to jurisdiction must be valid at the time the dispute arises.
• Withdrawal of Declarations: States can withdraw their Optional Clause declarations, although such withdrawals are subject to a notice period (usually six months).

Recent Example: The case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (2007) illustrates the complexities of jurisdiction. The ICJ found that Serbia had not directly committed genocide but had failed to prevent it, highlighting the Court’s ability to address complex issues of international law, even with jurisdictional challenges.