Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
G.E. Moore, a prominent figure in early 20th-century analytic philosophy, challenged prevailing philosophical skepticism with his defense of ‘common sense’. He argued that certain propositions, seemingly self-evident, are known with a degree of certainty that surpasses empirical verification. These ‘truisms’ – statements like “there exists at least one material thing” or “I am in pain” – form the bedrock of our everyday understanding of the world. Moore’s project wasn’t to *prove* these truths in the traditional sense, but to demonstrate their undeniable nature against the backdrop of philosophical doubt, particularly idealism and skepticism. This response will explore Moore’s arguments and critically assess their philosophical merit.
Moore’s Arguments for Common Sense
Moore’s defense of common sense is most explicitly articulated in his 1925 paper, “Proof of an External World.” He begins by acknowledging the philosophical difficulty in proving the existence of external objects. However, he contends that it is demonstrably false to claim that no external objects exist. He attempts to prove the existence of hands by holding them up and stating, “Here is one hand, and here is another.” He doesn’t offer this as a logical deduction, but as a direct refutation of the skeptical claim.
The Nature of ‘Common Sense’
For Moore, ‘common sense’ isn’t simply popular opinion or unreflective belief. It’s a set of propositions that any rational person, upon careful reflection, would acknowledge as true. These propositions are not derived from other beliefs; they are foundational. He identifies several such propositions, including:
- The existence of an external world.
- The existence of other minds.
- The reality of past events.
Arguments from Principia Ethica
While “Proof of an External World” is his most direct defense, Moore’s arguments in Principia Ethica (1903) also contribute to his broader philosophical project. He argues against naturalistic fallacies – the attempt to define ‘good’ in terms of natural properties. This demonstrates his commitment to recognizing certain truths (like the indefinability of ‘good’) as self-evident, not requiring further justification. This aligns with his view that some truths are simply known, forming the basis for ethical and metaphysical reasoning.
Critical Discussion of Moore’s Arguments
The Charge of Circularity
A primary criticism leveled against Moore is that his ‘proofs’ are circular. By asserting the existence of hands to disprove skepticism, he assumes the very thing he’s trying to prove – the reliability of our perceptual experience. Critics argue that he simply *asserts* the truth of common sense propositions rather than demonstrating them. A.J. Ayer, for example, argued that Moore’s proofs were merely performative utterances – statements that show, rather than tell, their truth.
Lack of Conclusive Proof
Another criticism is that Moore fails to provide a conclusive refutation of skepticism. Skeptics can always raise doubts about the reliability of perception, even in the face of Moore’s demonstrations. The fact that we *feel* certain about something doesn’t necessarily make it objectively true. Moore’s approach is seen by some as a psychological reassurance rather than a philosophical argument.
The Problem of Conflicting ‘Common Sense’ Beliefs
Furthermore, the notion of ‘common sense’ itself is problematic. Different cultures and individuals may hold conflicting ‘common sense’ beliefs. What seems self-evident to one person may not be to another. This raises questions about the universality and objectivity of Moore’s foundational propositions.
Moore’s Response to Criticism
Moore acknowledged the limitations of his arguments. He wasn’t attempting to provide a logically airtight proof against skepticism. Instead, he aimed to show that skeptical doubts are incompatible with the way we naturally and rationally experience the world. He believed that the burden of proof lies with the skeptic, not with those who accept the common sense view of reality.
Conclusion
Moore’s defense of common sense, while not without its flaws, remains a significant contribution to philosophical discourse. His arguments highlight the importance of recognizing the foundational role of certain beliefs in our understanding of the world. While his ‘proofs’ may not satisfy rigorous logical standards, they serve as a powerful reminder of the intuitive force of common sense and the difficulty of consistently maintaining a skeptical position in everyday life. His work continues to provoke debate about the nature of knowledge, certainty, and the limits of philosophical skepticism.
Answer Length
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