Discuss the debate between the Bhatta and the Prabhākara mīmāmsakas with reference to the nature of Non-existence (Abhāva) and its knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsā Debate on Non-existence (Abhāva)

The debate between the Bhatta and Prabhākara schools on Abhāva is a classic example of their divergent epistemological and ontological commitments. While both are realist schools, their understanding of what constitutes reality and how that reality is apprehended differs significantly regarding non-existence.

1. Nature of Non-existence (Abhāva)

The fundamental point of divergence lies in whether Abhāva is considered a distinct ontological category.

• Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā:
  • Rejects Abhāva as a distinct category (padārtha). For Prabhākara, non-existence is not a separate entity or a positive fact about the world.
  • It is understood as the mere existence of the substratum, or the absence of a positive counter-entity. For example, "there is no pot on the floor" does not mean a separate entity called "absence of pot" exists. Instead, it simply means that the floor exists in its current state, and the pot is not present there. The absence is not a distinct existent; it is a characteristic of the existing substratum.
  • This view aligns with their general reductionist approach, where phenomena are explained through positive existents.
• Bhatta Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa):
  • Accepts Abhāva as a distinct, real category (padārtha), alongside other positive categories like substance, quality, and action.
  • For Kumārila, absence is a positive fact about the world that can be directly apprehended. When we say "there is no pot on the floor," we are not merely perceiving the floor, but actively apprehending the non-existence of the pot as an objective reality. This non-existence is as real as any positive entity.
  • The Bhatta school considers Abhāva as a negative reality, an objective feature of things that can be known.
  • Kumārila further classifies Abhāva into various types, such as prāgabhāva (antecedent non-existence), pradhvaṃsābhāva (subsequent non-existence or destruction), atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence), and anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence or difference).

2. Knowledge of Non-existence (Pramāṇa for Abhāva)

The difference in the nature of Abhāva naturally leads to a divergence in identifying its valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

• Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā:
  • Rejects Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent pramāṇa. Since Abhāva is not a separate entity, it cannot be known by a distinct means of knowledge.
  • Knowledge of absence is implicitly derived from the perception (pratyaksha) of the substratum. For example, seeing an empty floor is sufficient to know the absence of a pot; no separate cognitive act for absence is needed. The perception of the bare ground itself, devoid of the pot, is the means of knowing the pot's absence.
  • Prabhākara accepts five pramāṇas: pratyaksha (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), śabda (verbal testimony), and arthāpatti (postulation).
• Bhatta Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa):
  • Posits Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as a distinct and independent pramāṇa for knowing Abhāva.
  • They argue that when one does not perceive an object (e.g., a pot) in a place where it could normally be perceived (given all necessary conditions for perception are met), this very non-perception directly reveals the non-existence of that object. It is a positive cognitive act that specifically apprehends absence.
  • Kumārila argues that perception requires sense-object contact, and since absence is not a positive object, it cannot be known through perception. Therefore, a separate pramāṇa, Anupalabdhi, is necessary. The knowledge "there is no pot" is a direct and immediate apprehension, not an inference or a mere perception of the ground.
  • Bhatta school accepts six pramāṇas, including Anupalabdhi, in addition to the five accepted by Prabhākara.

Comparative Table: Bhatta vs. Prabhākara on Abhāva

Feature	Bhatta Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila)	Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā
Nature of Abhāva	Recognizes Abhāva as a distinct, objective, and real category (padārtha). It is a negative reality.	Rejects Abhāva as a distinct category. Non-existence is merely the existence of the substratum or the absence of a positive counter-entity.
Ontological Status	Abhāva has independent ontological status.	Abhāva has no independent ontological status; it is reducible to positive entities.
Pramāṇa for Abhāva	Accepts Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as a distinct and independent pramāṇa for knowing Abhāva.	Rejects Anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa. Knowledge of absence is gained through Pratyaksha (perception) of the substratum.
Total Pramāṇas	Accepts six pramāṇas: Pratyaksha, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi.	Accepts five pramāṇas: Pratyaksha, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti.
Example of Knowing Absence	Knowing "no pot on the floor" is a direct apprehension of the pot's non-existence via Anupalabdhi.	Knowing "no pot on the floor" is a perception of the empty floor itself, which implicitly means the pot is not there.