Explain the ground on which Cārvāka rejects inference (anumāna) as a valid source of knowledge.

Cārvāka's Rejection of Inference (Anumāna)

The Cārvāka school rejects inference (anumāna) primarily because it believes that only direct perception can provide certain knowledge. They argue that inference, by its very nature, involves drawing conclusions about unperceived objects or events based on perceived signs. This leap from the perceived to the unperceived is deemed fundamentally uncertain and therefore not a valid source of true knowledge.

1. The Impossibility of Establishing Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti)

• The central ground for Cārvāka's rejection of inference lies in the impossibility of establishing *vyāpti*, which is the universal and unconditional concomitance between the *hetu* (reason or sign, e.g., smoke) and the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved, e.g., fire).
• For an inference like "where there is smoke, there is fire" to be universally true, one must have observed all past, present, and future instances of smoke and fire, and crucially, confirmed that smoke is never present without fire.
• Cārvāka argues that such an exhaustive observation is beyond human capacity. Our senses are limited to particular, present experiences. We can never perceive all possible instances or guarantee that no counter-example exists or will ever exist in the unobserved realm.
• Without absolute certainty about this invariable concomitance, any inference drawn from it remains merely probable, not certain, and thus cannot be considered valid knowledge.

2. Dependence on Unperceived Conditions (Upādhi)

• Cārvāka philosophers also point out the possibility of hidden conditions (*upādhi*) that might affect the relationship between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*.
• For instance, while we might infer fire from smoke, the smoke itself could be due to a hidden condition like wet fuel, producing smoke without a sustained fire that fits the general inference. Since these hidden conditions cannot always be perceived, the inference becomes unreliable.

3. Inference as a "Leap in the Dark"

• According to Cārvāka, when one infers something, one is taking a "leap in the dark" from the perceived to the unperceived. This leap is an act of faith, not a certainty derived from direct experience.
• Even if an inference leads to successful results sometimes, Cārvāka maintains that truth in such cases is merely an accident, not an inherent characteristic of all inferences.

4. Limited Scope of Perception

• Cārvāka's entire epistemology is anchored in the belief that "what cannot be perceived and understood by the senses does not exist." Since the *sādhya* in an inference is, by definition, not directly perceived at the moment of inference, its existence cannot be affirmed with certainty through this means.

Thus, for Cārvāka, to accept inference as a valid *pramāṇa* would be to compromise the absolute certainty offered by perception and to venture into the realm of speculation and probabilistic reasoning, which they consider epistemologically unsound.