Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1137 CE), the pre-eminent philosopher of the Vishishtadvaita school of Vedānta, presented a rigorous critique of Adi Shankara's (c. 8th century CE) Advaita Vedānta, especially its central doctrine of Māyāvāda. While Advaita posits Brahman as the sole reality and the world as an illusory superimposition (Māyā), Rāmānuja argued for a "qualified non-dualism" where Brahman, souls (chit), and matter (achit) are all real, with souls and matter forming the body of Brahman. His famous "Saptavidhānupapatti" or sevenfold inexplicability of Māyā highlighted what he perceived as fundamental logical inconsistencies in the Advaita concept of cosmic illusion, aiming to establish the reality of the world and individual souls.
Rāmānuja's critique of Māyāvāda is a cornerstone of Vishishtadvaita, demonstrating the inherent difficulties in Advaita's explanation of the empirical world as illusory. He argued that if Māyā is indefinable (neither real nor unreal), its very existence and operation become logically untenable. His seven objections, also known as Saptavidhānupapatti, are outlined below:
1. Ashrayānupapatti (Problem of the Locus of Ignorance)
- Objection: Rāmānuja questioned where Māyā or Avidya (ignorance) resides. It cannot reside in Brahman because Brahman is pure consciousness, self-luminous, and beyond ignorance. It also cannot reside in the individual soul (Jīva) because the Jīva itself, according to Advaita, is a product of Māyā. This creates a vicious circle: Māyā causes Jīva, but Māyā needs Jīva as its locus.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita often states that Avidya resides in Brahman but does not affect Brahman, similar to clouds covering the sun without affecting the sun's inherent luminosity.
2. Tirodhānānupapatti (Problem of Obscuration)
- Objection: Rāmānuja argued that Māyā cannot obscure Brahman. If Brahman is self-luminous (svaprakāsha) and of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot be veiled or obscured by anything, especially not by ignorance. Obscuration implies a dimming or suppression of light, which is impossible for the eternally effulgent Brahman.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita suggests that Māyā doesn't truly obscure Brahman but makes it appear obscured to the Jīva, like mistaking a rope for a snake.
3. Svarūpānupapatti (Problem of the Nature of Māyā)
- Objection: Rāmānuja questioned the very nature of Māyā. Advaita defines Māyā as "anirvacanīya" (indescribable) – neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat), nor both. Rāmānuja contended that anything must either be real or unreal; there is no third category. If Māyā is real, it contradicts Advaita's non-dualism by positing a second ultimate reality. If Māyā is unreal, it cannot be the cause of the apparently real world.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita maintains that Māyā's inexplicability is its unique characteristic, accounting for the phenomenal world without compromising Brahman's ultimate reality.
4. Anirvacanīyatvānupapatti (Problem of Indefinability)
- Objection: This objection is closely related to Svarūpānupapatti. Rāmānuja argued that the Advaita claim of Māyā being indefinable (neither real nor unreal) is illogical. All cognition and language operate within the categories of real or unreal. To claim something exists outside these categories is to render it unintelligible and beyond any means of knowledge (Pramāna).
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita would argue that Māyā operates on a transactional level of reality (vyavahārika sattā) distinct from ultimate reality (paramārthika sattā) and absolute unreality (prātibhāsika sattā).
5. Pramāṇānupapatti (Problem of the Means of Proof)
- Objection: Rāmānuja asserted that there is no valid means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) that can establish the existence of Māyā as a positive entity in the way Advaita describes it. Neither perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumāna), nor scripture (shabda) can prove a positive, yet indefinable, ignorance that obscures Brahman. Perception always cognizes what is real.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita appeals to universal experience of ignorance and the superimposition of the world, arguing that it is revealed through anubhava (experience) and negatable by true knowledge.
6. Nivṛttyanupapatti (Problem of Cessation or Removal)
- Objection: How can Māyā be removed by knowledge (Brahma-vidyā)? If Māyā is a beginningless (anādi) positive entity, mere knowledge cannot destroy it. If it is unreal, it does not exist to be removed. Rāmānuja questioned the mechanism by which the knowledge of Brahman can annihilate a beginningless, positive ignorance.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita posits that while Māyā is beginningless, it is not endless (ananta); it ceases upon the dawn of Self-realization, similar to how darkness, though present before light, is dispelled by light.
7. Nivartakānupapatti (Problem of the Remover)
- Objection: This objection focuses on the nature of the knowledge that removes Māyā. Rāmānuja asked what kind of knowledge can remove Māyā. If Māyā covers Brahman, and Brahman is the only reality, then the knowledge that removes Māyā must also be a product of Māyā, leading to a circular argument or infinite regress. The knowledge of an attributeless Brahman, as conceived by Advaita, cannot itself be an attribute or a process that effects removal.
- Advaita's Stance (as critiqued): Advaita maintains that the ultimate knowledge (ātma-jñāna) is not an attribute but the very nature of Brahman, which, when realized, simply reveals the non-existence of Māyā, rather than actively destroying it as a separate entity.
These objections collectively highlight Rāmānuja’s commitment to a philosophical system where reality is pluralistic, and the phenomenal world, while dependent on Brahman, is not illusory but a real manifestation of its glory. He argued for the reality of individual souls and a personal God (Vishnu/Nārāyaṇa) as the Supreme Brahman, equipped with auspicious qualities (Saguna Brahman), in contrast to Advaita's Nirguna Brahman.
| Feature | Advaita Vedānta (Shankara) | Vishishtadvaita Vedānta (Rāmānuja) |
|---|---|---|
| Ultimate Reality | Nirguna Brahman (attributeless, non-dual, impersonal) | Saguna Brahman (qualified, personal God - Vishnu/Nārāyaṇa) |
| Nature of World (Jagat) | Māyā (illusory, indefinable, appearance of Brahman) | Real (body of Brahman, dependent but not illusory) |
| Nature of Soul (Jīva) | Identical with Brahman (ultimately non-different) | Distinct but inseparable part of Brahman (attribute of Brahman) |
| Path to Liberation (Moksha) | Jñāna Yoga (realization of identity with Brahman) | Bhakti Yoga (devotion and surrender to Saguna Brahman) |
Conclusion
Rāmānuja's Saptavidhānupapatti represents a robust philosophical challenge to the Advaita concept of Māyā, arguing that it is logically inconsistent and undermines the reality of individual experience, ethical action, and the devotional path. By meticulously dissecting the nature, locus, obscuring power, and removability of Māyā, Rāmānuja established a foundation for his Vishishtadvaita philosophy, which upholds the reality of the world and individual souls as integral to a qualified, personal Brahman. His criticisms paved the way for a rich theological tradition that emphasizes devotion (Bhakti) and the compassionate nature of God, offering an alternative vision of Vedānta that continues to influence millions.
Answer Length
This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.