Wittgenstein: Early to Later Views on Language

Early Wittgenstein: The Quest for an Ideal Language and Logical Structure

In his early work, particularly the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by the ideas of Frege and Russell and sought to establish the logical foundations of language and its relationship to reality. He believed that language, at its core, possessed a precise logical structure that mirrored the structure of the world.

• Picture Theory of Language: Wittgenstein proposed that propositions "picture" facts in the world. For a proposition to be meaningful, it must share a logical form with the reality it represents. This implied a one-to-one correspondence between the elementary parts of language (names) and the simple objects in the world, forming 'atomic facts' and 'states of affairs'.
• Logical Atomism: The world, according to early Wittgenstein, consists of a totality of independent, atomic facts. Language, if it is to be meaningful, must reflect this atomic structure. The meaning of a proposition was determined by its truth-conditions, i.e., whether it accurately pictured a fact.
• Ideal Language: The goal of philosophy was to clarify thought by revealing the underlying logical structure of language. Any statement that could not be reduced to an elementary proposition picturing a fact was considered nonsensical. This led to the idea of an "ideal language" – a language free from the ambiguities and confusions of ordinary language, capable of precisely representing reality.
• Say/Show Distinction: Wittgenstein maintained that while empirical facts could be 'said' by propositions, certain things, such as logic, ethics, aesthetics, and the mystical, could only be 'shown' but not meaningfully articulated in language.

Transition and Later Wittgenstein: Language as Use and Forms of Life

Wittgenstein's later philosophy represented a profound self-critique and a radical departure from his earlier views. He came to realize that his earlier conception of an ideal language was overly simplistic and failed to account for the diverse and flexible nature of human language. This transition was driven by a realization that meaning is not solely referential but deeply embedded in human activities and social practices.

The statement, "We should look not to an ideal language which derives its meaning from facts and has a precise logical structure but empirically, to the ways in which languages are actually used," perfectly encapsulates this shift. Instead of seeking an abstract, underlying logical form, later Wittgenstein urged an empirical observation of how language functions in everyday life.

• Meaning as Use: The central tenet of later Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Words are not labels for pre-existing objects or ideas, but rather tools whose meaning is determined by the specific contexts and activities in which they are employed.
• Language-Games (Sprachspiel): This concept is pivotal to his later work, particularly in *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein likened different uses of language to "games," each with its own rules, goals, and practices. Just as the meaning of a chess piece is determined by its rules of movement within the game of chess, the meaning of a word is determined by its role within a specific 'language-game'. This concept emphasizes the practical, social, and contextual aspects of language. For example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, a request, or an answer, depending on the context or the 'game' being played.
• Forms of Life: Language-games are not isolated but are interwoven with broader human activities and shared practices, which Wittgenstein termed "forms of life." To understand a language, one must participate in or understand the form of life to which it belongs. Meaning is thus inherently public and social, rejecting the possibility of a private language.
• Family Resemblances: Challenging the search for a common essence or defining feature for concepts, Wittgenstein introduced the idea of "family resemblances." He argued that many concepts, like "game," do not have one single, overarching characteristic common to all their instances. Instead, they are connected by a complex network of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities, much like the resemblances among members of a family. This notion allows for the flexibility and open-endedness observed in natural language.
• Therapeutic Role of Philosophy: In his later views, Wittgenstein saw philosophy not as a quest for universal truths or an ideal language, but as an activity aimed at dissolving philosophical problems by exposing the linguistic confusions that give rise to them. Philosophical problems often arise when language is taken out of its ordinary context or when one tries to apply rules from one language-game inappropriately to another.

Comparative Analysis: Early vs. Later Wittgenstein

The table below summarizes the fundamental differences between Wittgenstein's early and later views on language and meaning.

Feature	Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)	Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations)
Core Idea of Language	A logical picture of reality; language has a fixed, underlying logical structure mirroring the world.	A tool or activity; meaning is derived from its actual use in diverse contexts.
Meaning of Words/Propositions	Determined by reference to objects and facts; truth-conditional semantics.	Meaning is use; determined by its function within specific "language-games."
Conception of Language	Ideal language; seeks logical purity and precision.	Ordinary language; embraces vagueness, flexibility, and context-dependence.
Philosophical Aim	To clarify thought by identifying the logical structure of language; drawing limits to what can be said.	To dissolve philosophical problems by examining how language functions in everyday life and exposing linguistic confusions.
Key Concepts	Picture Theory, Logical Atomism, Say/Show Distinction.	Language-Games, Forms of Life, Family Resemblances, Meaning as Use.
Nature of Reality	World as a totality of logically independent atomic facts.	Reality is inextricably linked to human practices and social contexts (forms of life).