India's Nuclear Shift: Reasons Post-1998

Reasons Behind India's Shift in Nuclear Position in 1998

The decision to conduct the Pokhran-II tests in 1998 was a culmination of several intertwined domestic, regional, and international factors that compelled India to move from nuclear ambiguity to overt weaponization.

1. Deteriorating Regional Security Environment

• Nuclear China: China's nuclear test in 1964 significantly impacted India's security perceptions. By 1998, China had a well-established nuclear arsenal and was considered a primary strategic concern due to historical border disputes (Sino-Indian War of 1962) and its growing military modernization. Prime Minister Vajpayee explicitly cited China as a factor in his communication to the US after the tests.
• Pakistan's Covert Nuclear Program: Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program, reportedly aided by China, posed an immediate and direct threat. Intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan was nearing nuclear weapon capability, which was confirmed by its subsequent nuclear tests in response to Pokhran-II. This created a nuclear imbalance in the subcontinent that India sought to rectify.
• Missile Proliferation: The proliferation of missile technology in the region, particularly Pakistan's acquisition of the Ghauri missile from North Korea, heightened India's concerns about the delivery mechanisms for potential nuclear attacks.

2. Discriminatory Global Non-Proliferation Regimes

• NPT and CTBT: India consistently viewed the NPT (1968) and CTBT (1996) as discriminatory instruments that sought to perpetuate a nuclear 'apartheid' by dividing states into nuclear-weapon-states and non-nuclear-weapon-states. India argued these treaties did not address universal disarmament and unfairly constrained its security options.
• Lack of Security Assurances: Despite its calls for universal disarmament, India failed to receive credible security assurances from nuclear-weapon states against nuclear threats. The experience of being denied assistance during the 1962 Sino-Indian War further reinforced the belief in self-reliance for security.
• Tightening Nuclear Stranglehold: The mid-1990s saw intensified international pressure, particularly from the US, to cap, roll back, and eventually eliminate India's nuclear program. The entry into force of the CTBT meant that the window for conducting tests was rapidly closing, making 1998 a critical juncture for India to demonstrate its capabilities.

3. Domestic Political Imperatives and Scientific Consensus

• Political Will: The coming to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 1998, with its stated manifesto commitment to reviewing India's nuclear policy and exercising the nuclear option, provided the political resolve needed for overt weaponization. The previous Narasimha Rao government had also initiated preparations for tests in 1995 but postponed them due to international pressure.
• Credibility of Deterrence: After the 1974 PNE, there was a perceived ambiguity about the actual weaponization capability of India's nuclear program. The 1998 tests were crucial to validate new designs, including a thermonuclear device, to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of a minimum nuclear deterrent.
• Scientific and Technological Momentum: Decades of indigenous research and development by institutions like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had built significant scientific and technological expertise. The scientific community was eager to demonstrate full-fledged capabilities.
• National Prestige and Strategic Autonomy: Overt nuclearization was also driven by a desire to assert India's rightful place on the global stage as a major power and to enhance its strategic autonomy, free from nuclear blackmail or external dictation.

4. Post-Cold War Geopolitical Shifts

• End of the Bipolar World: The disintegration of the Soviet Union, India's traditional strategic partner, in 1991, led to a more unipolar world dominated by the United States. This created a sense of strategic vulnerability for India, necessitating a stronger, independent security posture.
• Emergence of a "New World Order": The post-Cold War era witnessed a reordering of international priorities, with non-proliferation gaining prominence. India perceived that its voice would only be heard as a declared nuclear power, capable of shaping global norms rather than being subjected to them.

The 1998 tests were a decisive step, ending India's long-standing nuclear ambivalence and establishing it as a declared nuclear weapon state. This shift led to the articulation of India's nuclear doctrine of 'No First Use' and 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' in 1999, which has since guided its nuclear policy.

Factor Type	Pre-1998 Stance (Default Option)	Post-1998 Shift (Overt Nuclearization)
Regional Security	Dealing with nuclear China and covert Pakistani program through conventional means and diplomatic pressure.	Direct response to perceived nuclear threats from China and Pakistan, aiming for a credible deterrent.
Global Regimes	Advocacy for universal disarmament; refusal to sign discriminatory NPT/CTBT; maintaining nuclear option.	Rejection of discriminatory regimes through overt tests; establishing India as a de facto nuclear weapons state.
Domestic Politics	Nuclear ambiguity, strategic hedging, occasional PNE (1974) without full weaponization.	Strong political will for overt weaponization, driven by national security and prestige.
Geopolitical Context	Non-alignment, reliance on Soviet ties for security; engagement in multilateral disarmament forums.	Asserting strategic autonomy in a unipolar world; enhancing global standing.