Introduction
The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for an explicit division of powers between the Union and the States. However, the constitutional framework exhibits a marked unitary tilt, creating a quasi-federal system where Centre-State disputes remain a perennial reality, as reflected in the growing number of original suits filed before the Supreme Court under Article 131.
Key Drivers of Centre-State Friction
- Fiscal Centralisation: The excessive reliance on cesses and surcharges—which account for approximately 14.5% of the Centre's Gross Tax Revenue (2023–24)—directly circumvents the divisible tax pool shared with states under Article 270. In addition, curbs on state borrowing via Net Borrowing Ceilings have prompted states such as Kerala to challenge Union fiscal directives under Article 131.
- Gubernatorial Overreach: The office of the Governor has emerged as a significant flashpoint regarding assent to state legislation under Article 200. In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), the Supreme Court clarified that Governors cannot indefinitely sit on bills to paralyze state legislatures.
- Politicisation of Central Investigative Agencies: The jurisdictional reach of federal agencies has created friction, leading over ten states to withdraw general consent to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. The Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of West Bengal's Article 131 suit contesting unilateral CBI investigation inside state boundaries.
- Use of Emergency and Central Powers: While the misuse of President's Rule under Article 356 has been significantly constrained following the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment, operational mistrust over central oversight, legislative pre-emption on Concurrent List subjects, and law-and-order interventions remains prevalent.
Way Forward to Foster Constitutional Harmony
- Institutional Re-activation: Institutionalise regular deliberations of the Inter-State Council under Article 263 to ensure structured pre-legislative consultation on Concurrent List subjects.
- Implementation of Commission Recommendations: Enforce the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, particularly regarding the transparent appointment and removal of Governors and time-bound action on bills.
- Fiscal Rationalisation: Impose a constitutional or statutory cap on the share of cesses and surcharges to prevent the persistent shrinking of the states' divisible pool.
Conclusion
To safeguard constitutional federalism, Indian governance must transition from contestatory federalism to genuine cooperative federalism. Resolving structural disputes through mutual institutional respect, statutory fiscal equity, and active dialogue via intergovernmental forums is essential to sustaining democratic stability.