Introduction
The convergence of the criminalisation of politics and dark money fundamentally erodes the foundational principle of free and fair elections enshrined under Article 324 of the Indian Constitution. According to data from the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), 46% of Members of Parliament elected to the 18th Lok Sabha face criminal charges, with 31% implicated in serious offences such as murder and rape. This underscores a pervasive money-muscle nexus that subverts genuine democratic choice.
Challenges Faced by the Election Commission of India
The Election Commission of India (ECI) faces significant hurdles in curbing the entrenchment of illicit finance and criminal backgrounds in electoral contests:
- Opaque Campaign Finance: Despite the Supreme Court striking down the anonymous Electoral Bond Scheme in ADR v. Union of India (2024), electoral financing remains largely untraceable. The ECI lacks investigative mechanisms to track cash-for-votes, informal transactions, and donations routed through shell companies, exacerbated by the absence of caps on corporate political funding.
- Lack of Regulatory Punitive Powers: Under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951, the ECI possesses the authority to register political parties but lacks statutory power to de-register them. This severely curtails its ability to penalise structural violators, deregister dormant outfits used for money laundering, or discipline parties violating the model code.
- Concerns over Constitutional Autonomy: The enactment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 replaced the Chief Justice of India with a Union Cabinet Minister on the selection panel, departing from the judicial benchmark established in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023). This executive preponderance in appointments has sparked apprehension regarding institutional autonomy.
Key Structural Electoral Reforms Needed
To preserve electoral integrity and shield constitutional democracy from illicit influence, comprehensive structural reforms are indispensable:
- Strengthening Constitutional Independence under Article 324:
- Removal Parity: Constitutional protection against removal—currently available exclusively to the Chief Election Commissioner under Article 324(5)—must be extended to the other two Election Commissioners to insulate the entire Commission from executive pressures.
- Financial and Administrative Independence: The administrative expenses and secretariat of the ECI should be charged directly to the Consolidated Fund of India rather than remaining dependent on executive budgetary approvals, while safeguarding Article 324 institutions from subordination to external statutory bodies.
- Curbing Dark Money and Decriminalisation:
- State Funding of Elections: Implementation of the Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommendations on partial state funding in kind can help lower the reliance on opaque private donations and level the playing field.
- Empowering De-registration: Section 29A of the RPA, 1951 should be amended, as advised by the Law Commission’s 244th Report, granting the ECI explicit statutory powers to de-register delinquent political parties and establishing the filing of false asset or criminal affidavits as a ground for immediate disqualification.
Conclusion
Electoral integrity is the bedrock of representative democracy in India. Rescuing the electoral sphere from criminal elements and untraced capital necessitates robust institutional backing, statutory empowerment of the ECI, and political will to enact long-pending legislative reforms.