Model Answer
0 min readIntroduction
India’s ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy, declared in 1998 following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests, is a cornerstone of its nuclear doctrine. It signifies a commitment not to initiate a nuclear strike, reserving the right to retaliate only in the event of a nuclear or biological/chemical attack on Indian territory or its forces. This policy aimed to project India as a responsible nuclear power and reduce the risk of accidental escalation. However, the evolving strategic dynamics in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, particularly concerning Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and China’s growing military capabilities, have prompted a re-evaluation of the NFU policy’s continued efficacy and credibility.
Challenges from Pakistan
Pakistan’s nuclear program has always been viewed through the lens of deterring a conventional Indian military advantage. Its development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) – short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons – poses a significant challenge to India’s NFU policy.
- First Use Threat: Pakistan explicitly reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, even in a conventional conflict, if it perceives an existential threat. This ‘first use’ posture undermines the credibility of India’s NFU.
- TNW Proliferation Risk: The deployment of TNWs lowers the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘full spectrum response’ suggests a willingness to employ TNWs to offset India’s conventional superiority.
- Asymmetric Escalation: Pakistan might initiate a limited nuclear strike with TNWs to deter India from launching a large-scale conventional offensive, effectively holding India hostage.
The 2019 Balakot airstrike and Pakistan’s subsequent response highlighted these vulnerabilities. While a full-scale nuclear exchange was averted, the incident demonstrated the potential for rapid escalation in a crisis situation.
Challenges from China
China’s nuclear capabilities and strategic intentions present a different set of challenges to India’s NFU policy.
- Larger Arsenal & Modernization: China possesses a significantly larger and more modern nuclear arsenal than India, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching targets across the globe. Its ongoing nuclear modernization program further exacerbates this asymmetry.
- No Formal NFU: Unlike India, China does not have a declared NFU policy. While it states it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, this is a political declaration, not a codified doctrine.
- Border Disputes & Strategic Competition: The ongoing border dispute with China, coupled with increasing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, raises concerns about potential conflict escalation. China’s growing military presence in the Indian Ocean region also adds to India’s security concerns.
- Dual-Use Infrastructure: China’s development of dual-use infrastructure, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, makes it difficult to assess its true nuclear capabilities and intentions.
The Galwan Valley clash in 2020 underscored the potential for conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), raising questions about the effectiveness of NFU in deterring Chinese aggression.
Arguments for and against Revising NFU
| Arguments for Revision | Arguments against Revision |
|---|---|
| Enhanced Deterrence: Removing the NFU constraint could enhance India’s deterrence posture, particularly against Pakistan, by raising the cost of aggression. | Global Condemnation: Revising NFU could invite international condemnation and damage India’s image as a responsible nuclear power. |
| Credibility & Stability: A credible threat of first use could deter Pakistan from employing TNWs or initiating a limited nuclear strike. | Escalation Risk: Abandoning NFU could lower the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of accidental or unintended escalation. |
| Addressing Asymmetry: In the face of China’s growing nuclear capabilities, a revised NFU policy could provide India with greater strategic flexibility. | Doctrine Stability: Maintaining NFU provides a degree of predictability and stability in the nuclear realm. |
The Ajai Shukla Committee (2018) recommended that India review its NFU policy, suggesting a move towards a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ posture. However, the government has not yet implemented these recommendations.
Current Status & Recent Developments
In October 2023, India reaffirmed its commitment to the NFU policy, but added a caveat stating that it would be reviewed in the event of a chemical or biological weapons attack. This modification reflects a growing recognition of the evolving threat landscape and the need to adapt India’s nuclear doctrine accordingly. The government maintains that NFU remains the cornerstone of its nuclear policy, but acknowledges the need for flexibility in response to emerging threats.
Conclusion
India’s NFU policy remains a complex and contested issue. While it has served as a cornerstone of its responsible nuclear power status, the evolving strategic challenges from Pakistan and China necessitate a continuous reassessment of its efficacy. The recent modification regarding chemical and biological weapons attacks demonstrates a pragmatic approach to adapting the doctrine. Ultimately, maintaining a credible and stable nuclear deterrence requires a delicate balance between commitment to NFU, addressing emerging threats, and avoiding actions that could lower the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of escalation. A continued focus on arms control, dialogue, and confidence-building measures remains crucial for managing nuclear risks in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.
Answer Length
This is a comprehensive model answer for learning purposes and may exceed the word limit. In the exam, always adhere to the prescribed word count.